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Articles
Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of
Women to Positions of Power
by
MARY F. RADFORD*
Christine Craft, Elizabeth Hishon, Ann Hopkins. What do a news-
caster, an attorney, and an accountant have in common? All three are
well-educated in their chosen professional fields.' All three practiced
their professions in mainstream, prestigious arenas.2 All three were paid
high salaries3 and were on the road to top levels of leadership and man-
agement in their professions, but came to abrupt halts in their rise to
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; B.A. 1974,
Newcomb College of Tulane University; J.D. 1981, Emory University. The author thanks
Linda Hinson, Leslie McDuffie, and Deborah Vaughan for their expert research assistance and
Professor Steven Kaminshine for his invaluable contributions to the conceptual development
of this article.
1. For example, Craft graduated from the University of California at Santa Barbara in
1968, where she received a liberal arts degree in English and anthropology. Craft v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 870-71 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 766
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986). Hishon received her B.A. degree
from Wellesley College in 1966. She received her J.D. degree from Columbia University
School of Law where she was a Harlan Fiske Stone scholar. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW
DIRECTORY 3087B (128th ed. 1988).
2. Craft began her career in broadcasting as a weeknight weather reporter and substitute
sports and news anchor. In 1978, CBS hired her to host "Women in Sports," a portion of the
CBS Sports Spectacular. In 1979, she worked as a reporter for a Santa Barbara station before
accepting the anchor position at KMBC-TV, Channel 9 (an ABC affiliate) in Kansas City in
1980. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 870-71. Hishon began her legal career at the Atlanta law firm of
King & Spalding in 1972. She worked in the firm's real estate department until she was denied
promotion in 1979. Stewart, Are Women Lawyers Discriminated Against at Large Law Firms?,
Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Hopkins was employed by the accounting partnership
of Touche Ross before joining Price Waterhouse in 1978. While at Price Waterhouse, she won
contract awards for the firm with the Department of State and the Farmers Home Administra-
tion. During the year she was first considered for partnership, she billed more hours than any
other partnership candidate. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461-62 (D.C. Cir.
1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
3. Craft, for example, contracted to receive $35,000 for her first year's work at the
KMBC station and $38,500 for her second year. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 872.
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success when they attempted to break through to levels of power that
had heretofore been occupied almost exclusively by men.4 All three are
women.
The cases of Craft v. Metromedia, 5 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 6 and
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins7 were argued and decided on a variety of
legal grounds. The Craft case involved allegations of sex discrimination 8
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 violations of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963,10 and fraud.11 The Supreme Court in Hishon
limited the decision to the issues of whether a partnership constituted an
"employer" for purposes of Title VII and whether promotion to partner-
ship was a "privilege or condition of employment" so as to prohibit an
adverse decision based solely on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 12  In Hopkins, the Supreme Court determined that Price
Waterhouse had the burden of proving that the denial of Hopkins' pro-
motion was due to a lack of interpersonal skills and was not based on
4. Craft was removed from her position as anchor chair of the KMBC News when
viewer research results on her proved negative. Id. at 873-74. Hishon was denied partnership
after eight years of work at King & Spalding, one of the most prestigious law firms in the
Southeast. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 72 (1984). Hopkins was denied partner-
ship at Price Waterhouse, one of the nation's "Big Eight" accounting firms. The term "glass
ceiling" has been coined to describe the obstacle women reach as they attempt to break
through to upper level management positions. Felice Schwartz has described the phenomenon
more accurately as a
cross-sectional diagram .... The barriers to women's leadership occur when poten-
tially counterproductive layers of influence on women-maternity, tradition, sociali-
zation-meet management strata pervaded by the largely unconscious
preconceptions, stereotypes, and expectations of men. Such interfaces do not exist
for men and tend to be impermeable for women.
Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REV. 65, 68 (Jan./Feb.
1989). It is important to note at the outset that the careers of Craft, Hishon, and Hopkins
were not affected in any manner (leave time, shortened working hours) by the one factor most
commonly facing working women-child-bearing. See note 21 infra.
5. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
6. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
7. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
8. Craft claimed that the personal appearance standards imposed upon her by the sta-
tion were "based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes and were applied to women
more constantly and vigorously than they were applied to men." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210.
9. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1 1989).
10. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (West 1978).
11. Craft claimed that Metromedia was satisfied with her appearance when she was first
hired and that she had made clear before her acceptance of the contract that she absolutely
was opposed to any "makeover" or other substantial alteration of her appearance. Craft, 766
F.2d at 1217-18.
12. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 72-76 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l)).
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impermissible bias, reflected by stereotypical thinking about female part-
nership candidates. 13
Despite the variety of legal theories and divergent outcomes of these
cases, 14 the legal battles of these women reflect an overriding theme:
13. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct at 1793-95. "[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding
of liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Id. at 1795.
14. Craft's complaint alleged not only that Metromedia discriminated against her be-
cause of her sex, but also that she was paid less than similarly situated males. She also alleged
that Metromedia had made fraudulent misrepresentations to induce-her to accept employment.
Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 869-70. The jury returned a verdict for Metromedia on the Equal Pay
claim, but voted in favor of Craft on the sex discrimination and fraud claims, recommending
actual damages of $375,000 and punitive damages of $125,000. Id. at 868. The district court,
however, entered judgment in favor of Metromedia on the sex discrimination claim (the jury's
decision being an advisory one only) and ordered a new trial on the fraud count due to the
excessive verdict. Id. On retrial the jury once again decided in favor of Craft, this time recom-
mending $225,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Craft, 766 F.2d at
1210. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the district court's ruling that
Craft had not been subjected to sex discrimination. Id. at 1217. The Court of Appeals also
affirmed that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to have determined that Metromedia
had intentionally made false statements to Craft in an effort to induce her to accept employ-
ment at KMBC. Id. at 1220-21. Craft appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but her
petition for grant of certiorari was denied. 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
Hishon filed her three-count complaint in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Georgia, alleging sex discrimination in the partnership decision, violation of the
Equal Pay Act, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to a law firm's partnership deci-
sions. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1025-26. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the rul-
ing below. Id. at 1030. The United States Supreme Court held that Hishon's complaint did
state a claim under Title VII. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78-79. Although the case was remanded for
trial on the merits, no trial occurred. A settlement was reached between Hishon and the law
firm, the terms of which remain confidential. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at B5, col. 2.
Hopkins filed her Title VII action in the District Court of the District of Columbia, alleg-
ing that criticisms of her interpersonal skills were fabricated and that Price Waterhouse rou-
tinely elevated males whose interpersonal skills were deficient but who were highly qualified in
other areas. Hopkins also claimed that the criticisms of her interpersonal skills stemmed from
discriminatory stereotyping by male partners and that the partnership evaluation process was
discriminatory in nature. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113-14 (D.D.C.
1985). The district court determined that the accounting firm's decision not to elevate Hop-
kins was indeed tainted with discriminatory evaluations. Id. at 1120. The court, however,
rejected Hopkins' claim that she was constructively discharged by the firm. Id. at 1121. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in Hopkins' favor on all
counts, including the constructive discharge. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,
465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The United States Supreme Court remanded the case for further
consideration. The majority agreed that Price Waterhouse had allowed discriminatory atti-
tudes to affect its promotion process and thus had the burden of proving that the same decision
would have been made about Hopkins absent the consideration of gender. The Supreme Court
required that Price Waterhouse carry this burden only by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than by the "clear and convincing" standard required by the lower courts. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. at 1792.
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three trained, competent professional women were denied admission to
the highest levels of their professions due not to any failings in their abili-
ties to perform capably, but rather to the fact that they were perceived to
lack the personal qualifications that the decisionmakers deemed neces-
sary for success. Craft was removed as anchor due to her personal ap-
pearance and choice of attire.1 5 Hishon was not promoted because,
although "very nice and pleasant... she just didn't fit in" at a law firm
that received national notoriety for its bathing suit competition among
summer associates.16 Hopkins was turned down for partnership due to
her lack of "social graces"-articulated by one critic as her need to "take
a course at charm school."' 17
Few would deny that American business practices are structured
such that personal qualifications are an important factor in the advance-
ment of persons of either gender. The question arising from the Craft-
Hishon-Hopkins trilogy is not whether personal qualifications are a valid
measure of potential success, but rather whether females suffer dispro-
portionately from this evaluative device, which, although neutral on its
face, is affected profoundly by preconceived notions of the "appropriate"
roles and traits of women and men.
In somewhat narrow Title VII terms, the question is whether the
evaluation of personal characteristics is based on stereotypical notions so
15. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215. For a discussion of the district court opinion in Craft in the
context of other grooming code cases decided under Title VII, see Note, Christine - The Craft
without an Anchor: Craft v. Metromedia, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181 (1984) (authored
by Rhonda Blond-Rosen).
16. Stewart, supra note 2, at 17, col. 2. See also Panel Discussion, Plaintiffs, Lawyers and
the Courts (Sarah Weddington, Ann Hopkins, Elizabeth Hishon), delivered at Women and the
Constitution: A Bicentennial Perspective, Atlanta, Georgia (February, 1988) (audiotape on file
with author). Because the Hishon case was settled confidentially, the facts of the case are
available in few sources other than newspaper and magazine articles published at the time of
the Supreme Court decision.
17. A supporter of Hopkins sought to excuse her behavior as overcompensating for being
a woman. Her personnel file contained comments concerning her use of profanity, and a mem-
ber of the firm's Admissions Committee referred to her language choice as "one of the nega-
tives." Another supporter defended this conclusion by stating that the concern was only
addressed because "she is a lady using foul language" and many males were "worse" than
Hopkins. One supporter described her as "macho," but found her otherwise to be "at the top
of the list or way above average." Finally, a supporter referred to her as having matured from
a "tough-talking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to an authoritative, formidable but
much more appealing lady partner candidate." Among the complaints about her personality
was one from a partner opposing her candidacy who stated that she should take a "course at
charm school." The Board who made the partnership decision found that she needed "social
grace." This conclusion was conveyed to her by her supervisor (also an ardent supporter of
her candidacy) who relayed to Hopkins that she should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry."
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 463.
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as to constitute impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex. But the
issue takes on a much broader dimension when examined in light of the
growing body of jurisprudence relating to the concept of women in
power. Craft, Hishon, and Hopkins sought "power" in their professions
and each met a roadblock of such an opaque nature as to render her
temporarily powerless. An argument can be made that these roadblocks
were internal as well as external. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
defendants in both Craft and Hopkins, it may be asserted that the plain-
tiffs refused to take steps necessary to attain the power they sought. 18 At
the same time, these women appeared to have been judged against stan-
dards that a male would not have been forced to satisfy, 19 or that would
not have been an issue due to his very gender.20
This Article will examine the internal and external stereotyping
prevalent in today's workplace and the degree to which that steieotyping
seems to be holding back women, both as individuals and as a group,
from achieving positions of "equality" and "power" in 'our society.21
18. The news director of KMBC initially informed Craft that consultants were hired by
the station to work with on-air personnel regarding their cloth ifig and make-up. Craft agreed
to work with the consultant. The management of the station, however, continually disap-
proved of Craft's on-air appearance as "inappropriate." She was told to dress more conserva-
tively and to wear make-up properly. Another consultant was brought in to work with Craft's
wardrobe and make-up. Additionally, Craft was assisted by a clothing consultant from a
nearby department store. Craft was not ordered to wear the clothes selected by the consultants
and in fact refused to wear several of the outfits. She also apparently refused to comply with
suggestions from the management and the clothing consultants that she purchase clothes with
more "feminine touches" as her current wardrobe was "too masculine." Craft, 766 F.2d at
1213-14. Hopkins' difficulties were in the area of personality and interactions with colleagues,
supervisors, and staff. She was described in her initial evaluation for partnership as "overly
aggressive, unduly harsh, impatient with staff and very demanding." Hopkins, 825 F.2d at
463. These problems apparently worsened after she was denied partnership the first time, as
two of her former promoters came to oppose strongly her candidacy the next year. Id. The
court did not speculate that perhaps the unfairness of the original denial caused Hopkins to
become bitter and have less patience with the males who had allowed this situation to
continue.
19. In the cases of both Craft and Hopkins, issues such as hair .styles and make-up
seemed to affect strongly their male superiors' views of their competence. KMBC had a set of
standards for both male and female anchors. For male anchors, the stress was on "profes-
sional image" while for females "professional elegance" was important. Women anchors were
prohibited from wearing the same outfit more than once in every three or four week period
while male anchors were allowed to wear the same suit once or even twice a week. Craft was
told by one of the consultants that "viewers-particularly women viewers--criticize women
more severely than men." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214.
20. It is rare that men are viewed as "too macho" or as over-compensating for being a
man.
21. Perhaps the most prevalent stereotype affecting women in the workforce today is the
image of women as the primary childrearers in a "normal" family situation. As a result of this
image, as well as the very real needs of those women who do choose to combine working and
child-care, a new concept for working women has entered the workplace, referred to alterna-
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Part I of the Article is a survey of current feminist approaches to the
philosophical issues brought to bear in gender discrimination employ-
ment cases. This Part analyzes the interplay between the concepts of sex
discrimination as an issue of "power" and sex discrimination as an issue
of "equality." Part II examines psychological and sociological studies
that illustrate the prevalence of sex stereotyping in the workplace. Part
III discusses the manner in which a victim of sex stereotyping must
prove sex discrimination in Title VII suits, with particular emphasis on
the recent Supreme Court decision in Hopkins. Part IV proposes an al-
ternative approach for courts in dealing with such cases. This approach
is designed to hold employers accountable for allowing deeply embedded
stereotypes to taint their decisionmaking processes, without necessarily
producing a windfall for an employee who would not have been pro-
moted absent the stereotyping. The former aspect of this approach is
based on the theory that sex stereotyping constitutes a harmful ingredi-
ent in any employment situation, one that may adversely affect a variety
of employees even though it may not be demonstrable as the legal
"cause" of negative employment decisions. This aspect treats sex dis-
crimination as a "power" struggle and is designed to counterbalance the
use of sex stereotyping as a device to exclude women from positions of
power. The latter aspect of the approach is based on the view that the
ultimate goal of all studies of the gender problem is to effect a truly an-
drogynous2 2 work environment in which men and women are treated
tively as the "mommy track" or the "career-and-family track." Women choosing (or placed
on) this track accept lower pay and less prestige and power in return for more flexible working
hours. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 70-71. Many feminists object to this concept on two
.grounds: 1) it merely is an attempt to fit women into a system that is masculine in its orienta-
tion, and 2) it assumes that family is only or primarily the woman's responsibility. See Lewin,
Article Stirs Debate Over Women's Role as Managers, The Atlanta Const., Mar. 9, 1989, at I D,
col. 1. The debate on this issue was foreshadowed by the debates over equal treatment versus
special treatment with regard to maternity leave and pregnancy benefits discussed infra at note
33. The stereotyping surrounding both pregnancy and child-rearing are outside the scope of
this Article. The problems encountered by Craft, Hishon, and Hopkins were somewhat unu-
sual in that they were not directly related to the focus on women as child-rearers. Rather, the
stereotypes encountered by these women were even more insidious in that they were subtly
guised in ostensibly neutral evaluations of the women's personal characteristics.
22. This term is used guardedly, as the studies in Part II indicate that an "androgynous"
person may still be a person who is measured in accordance with "male" traits. This author's
vision of an "androgynous workplace" encompasses both a workplace in which the inherent
worth of the traditionally devalued "female" roles and traits is recognized and validated and a
workplace in which persons of either gender may exhibit a combination of the traits tradition-
ally associated with either gender without risk of being characterized as "deviant." This ideal
workplace is flexible and open to strengths and weaknesses of both genders and encourages
participation in outside responsibilities, particularly family life, by both sexes. The "androgy-
nous" workplace does not strive to set a "middle ground" between "male" and "female,"
which few workers of either gender could meet. See criticism of "androgyny" theories in Lit-
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"equally," and the terms "promotion" and "sex" have neither a blatant
nor a subliminal connection.
I. Current Feminist Theories Relevant to Women Seeking
Positions of Power
Observers of the expanding field of feminist thought have com-
mented on the proportions of the debate as to the goals, methodology,
and proper stance of women in today's society.23 This debate is both an
"internal" debate among feminists24 and an external one involving
nonfeminists who dispute the need for and validity of feminist thought.25
Much of this debate revolves around the question of whether gender is an
issue of equality or an issue of power. If women's experiences in the
world are put on a spectrum, however, it is evident that the gender strug-
gle involves elements both of a struggle for equality and of a struggle for
power.
tleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1292.-93 (1987). Rather, this
ideal workplace rests on the theory that individuals, regardless of gender, are able to work and
compete equally in an arena in which the "deck" is not already "stacked" in favor of one
gender. This author agrees basically with the theory of Professor Catharine MacKinnon and
other radical feminists that "equality" cannot be achieved by women until men alone are no
longer allowed to define the parameters of that term. See A. DWORKIN & C. MAcKINNON,
PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 22-23 (1988).
This Article represents a modest attempt to combine both that interim step (dismantling the
current power hierarchy by attacking the underlying stereotypes of the male-dominated deci-
sionmakers) with the goal of promoting only the best qualified persons to positions of power.
Although she rejects the "androgyny" concept, Professor Robin West accurately describes this
author's vision of the role of jurisprudential thought in structuring the ideal workplace as
follows:
Feminism must envision a post-patriarchal world, for without such a vision we have
little direction.... That vision is not necessarily androgynous; surely in a utopian
world the presence of differences between people will be cause only for celebration.
In a utopian world, all forms of life will be recognized, respected and honored. A
perfect legal system will protect against harms sustained by all forms of life, will
recognize life affirming values generated by all forms of being.
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 72 (1988).
23. See Marcus, Spiegelman (Moderators), Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the
Law-A Conversation, reprinted in 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 12, 19-20, 64-68 (1985) (panel
discussion held as part of the James McCormick Mitchell Lecture Series at State University of
New York in Buffalo) [hereinafter Feminist Discourse]; Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations
on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 4-9 (1988) (offering
an overview and critique of feminist legal thought).
24. See articles cited infra note 33. See generally Dalton, supra note 23; Williams, Decon-
structing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
25. See Wilkinson, Women in Non-Traditional Fields and Feminism: An Uneasy Connec-
tion?, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 153 (1988) (describing tension between women occupational pioneers
and feminist thinkers).
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Even before Justice Bradley wrote his famous commentary on the
divinely mandated role of women, 26 women in American society were
engaged in an open struggle for equal footing with men. This fight for
"equality" manifested itself in everything from the right to serve as the
personal representative in an estate administration 27 to the ability to at-
tain and maintain jobs in fields historically open only to men. 28
"Equality" theory began as a comparison of the treatment of women
with the treatment of men. 29 The focus initially was on laws and policies
that treated women less favorably than men.30 It soon was evident that
laws that ostensibly favored women could have the harmful result of
those that discriminated against women in the workplace. 31 These laws
became the target of proponents of the "equal treatment" theory, which
viewed as unacceptable any rule based either directly or indirectly on
gender-based generalization. 32 The equal treatment theory, however,
26. In his concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 142 (1872), Justice
Bradley noted that "The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things .. "
27. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding statutory preference of men to women
as administrators of wills violates equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
28. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (agent-teleg-
rapher); Manley v. Mobile County, Ala., 441 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977) (Identification
Assistant Officer in men's prison); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1971) (bartender); State Div. of Human Rights v. New York State Dept. of Correctional
Servs., 61 A.D.2d 25, 401 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1978) (cook in men's prison).
29. As Professor Christine Littleton has noted, "The richness and diversity of feminist
legal theory that has developed over the last two decades is hard to reduce to a simple
schema." Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1043, 1045
(1987). The description that follows is intended only as brief overview of the theoretical
framework within which has evolved this author's suggested alternative approach for courts
dealing with situations such as those which arose in the Craft Hishon, and Hopkins cases.
This author also recognizes the underlying weakness in attempting to promulgate theories for
"all women" that ignore the differences between the obstacles encountered by women seeking
positions of prestige and power and those encountered by most women in their jobs as clerks,
cleaners, sales personnel, and secretaries. See McCloud, Feminism's Idealist Error, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 283-84 (1986). The theories set forth in this Article are limited
to the judicial difficulties in dealing with women denied promotions or fired from top-level
positions due to stereotyped notions of women in such positions.
30. See discussion of the "comparison" aspect of the equality theory in Lacey, Legislation
Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist Perspective, 14 J. OF LAW & Soc'y 411,
416-17 (1987).
31. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding law limiting working
hours for women in laundries).
32. One of the most articulate proponents of the equal treatment theory, Professor
Wendy Williams, described the two propositions of this theory as follows: 1) "sex-based gen-
eralizations are generally impermissible whether derived from physical differences such as size
and strength, from cultural role assignments such as breadwinner or homemaker, or from
some combination of innate and ascribed characteristics, such as the greater longevity of the
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was attacked vigorously in the context of pregnancy and child-rearing
issues by "special treatment" proponents, who argued that certain "real"
differences between men and women, particularly as they related to
child-bearing, could not be ignored if women were to achieve an equal
po sition in the workplace. 33 An important offshoot of this debate was
the conclusion by both sides that the framework of the working world in
which women vie for equality is male-structured and male-dominated. 34
From this examination has emerged the more recent theory that women
are physically, sociologically, and psychologically doomed from the out-
setif they attempt to achieve equality in a world in which the norm is
male.35 Sex stereotyping in the workplace clearly reflects this theory;
"female" or "feminine" roles and traits are usually the antithesis of the
traits thought related to success and effectiveness. Consequently, femi-
nists have extended the discourse on equality to encompass the notion
that true equality is not currently available for women because male-de-
fined reality renders women unequal.36
average woman compared to the average man"; and 2) statutes that are ostensibly neutral "but
which have a disproportionately negative effect upon one sex warrant, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, placing a burden of justification upon the party defending the law or rule in
court." Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 329-30 (1984-85).
33. As pregnancy and childbirth issues are not the focus of this Article, the "equal treat-
ment versus special treatment" debate is given only superficial coverage. For discussions illus-
trating the richness of this debate, see Dowd, Maternity Leave." Taking Sex Differences into
Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 699 (1986); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out
of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Freedman, Sex
Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Kay, Equality and
Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Krieger & Cooney,
The Miller- Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action, and the Meaning of Women's
Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution
132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Littleton, supra note 22; Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. RE V 1497 (1983); Scales, Towards a Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1980-81); Williams, supra note 32; Note, Toward a Redef-
inition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1981).
34. See Dowd, supra note 33, at 719; Finley, supra note 33, at 1122-42; Williams, supra
note 32, at 355-56. See also, Brown, Parmet & Baumann, The Failure of Gender Equality: An
Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 573, 583-90 (1987); Littleton, supra
note 22, at 1292-1301 (synimetrical approaches to sexual equality).
35. See Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist Jurisprudence,
38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129, 1170-73; Littleton, supra note 22, at 1317-21; Littleton, supra
note 29, at 1048.
36. See A. DWORKIN & C. MACKINNON, supra note 22. Dworkin and MacKinnon the-
orize that equality for women and minorities "means taking power from those who have it
[white men] .... Equality means someone loses power.... The mathematics are simple:
taking power from exploiters extends and multiplies the rights of those they have been exploit-
ing." Id. at 22-23.
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Professor Christine Littleton has extrapolated from the body of fem-
inist legal theory "three interrelated theories to explain and resist wo-
men's inequality. ' 37 These theories are sex discrimination, gender
oppression, and sexual subordination. Sex discrimination is evident
when, without justification, one gender is preferred over another. This
discrimination often arises from unjustified stereotypes relating to each of
the genders. 38 Gender oppression is manifested in situations in which
women or men are restricted to certain social roles. 39 Sexual subordina-
tion occurs in those situations in which anything associated with one
gender is devalued or disaffirmed or when the gender is identified with
anything that is disaffirmed or devalued. 4° Littleton's third "inequality"
theory, sexual subordination, provides a bridge to the theory of those
who see the gender problem as a "power" problem rather than as an
equality problem. It also correlates with studies discussed in Part II that
show clearly, at least as they pertain to management positions in the cur-
rent workforce, that the stereotypical notions of women's roles and traits
strongly devalue women.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon, a "radical" feminist,41 views the
gender issue not as a question of equality, but rather as a question of
power or dominance. 42 While some may argue that equality and power
are interchangeable or that equality is a prerequisite of power, the con-
cept of gender as a power problem offers a viable and unifying framework
for analysis of the evolution of women into positions of power in the
workforce.
37. Littleton, supra note 29, at 1045.
38. Id.
39. Littleton puts the Hopkins case in this category as well as the case of DeSantis v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), in which a male nursery school teacher
was fired because he was considered too effeminate. Littleton, supra note 29 at 1045-46.
40. Id. at 1046. Littleton describes child-raising as the "classic case" of sexual subordina-
tion. She also cites Catharine MacKinnon's focus on the harm of pornography as a devalua-
tion of women. Id.
41. MacKinnon distinguishes "radical" feminists from "liberal" feminists who view the
gender issue as an "equality" issue (or, as she terms it, a "differences" issue). See Feminist
Discourse, supra note 23, at 21. A somewhat similar division among feminists is described by
Professor Robin West as "cultural" feminism versus "radical" feminism. See West, supra note
22, at 13.
42. Actually, MacKinnon uses the term "dominance" rather than "power." She views
gender as "a hierarchy-in which some people have power and some people are powerless,
relatively speaking." See Feminist Discourse, supra note 23, at 21. She also describes equality
theory as a theory of "difference" that focuses on whether women are the same as or different
from men. Id. at 22-23. As noted above, she finds true "equality" unavailable for women until
the current male power structure is dismantled. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See generally, C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987).
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Initially it may seem anomalous to view the "power" theory as a
unifying one. Stereotypical notions of feminists are of abrasive, aggres-
sive, bra-burning "pushy broads." To view the gender problem as a
power issue seems tantamount to setting this outmoded image in con-
crete. But, the word "power" embodies a range of notions from the neg-
ative of "powerless" to the positive of "powerful." "Power," in other
words, suggests both the power "not to be" powerless and the power "to
be" powerful.
When MacKinnon speaks of gender as a power issue, she cites sta-
tistics detailing the degree to which women are powerless in our society.
She cites the staggering rates at which females are abused as children,
raped, sexually harassed in the workplace, battered, forced to engage in
prostitution, exploited through pornography, and condemned to a life of
poverty. 43 This concept of the powerlessness of women highlights what
is perhaps the most fundamental agreement among those engaged in the
debate on gender issues. There are few who would argue that women,
simply by reason of their gender, should be raped, abused, battered, ex-
ploited, harassed, or poor. In other words, while the parameters of some
of these issues may vary according to the degree of one's commitment to
feminist thinking,4 it is generally agreed that women should not remain
powerless in our society.
Given the consensus that women should not be perennial victims in
our society, the next question is the degree to which they should be al-
lowed to participate in the activities of modern society. While there may
be some peripheral sociological debate regarding the role of women,
again there seems to be little'disagreement, at least from a legal perspec-
tive, that women should be allowed to participate as members of the cur-
rent workforce.45 Along the spectrum of "power," therefore, the
43. In Feminine Discourse, supra note 23, at 26, MacKinnon cites the following statistics
from Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Interfamilial or Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of
Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 137 (1983): 38% of young girls (and 10% of
young boys) are sexually abused by male family members; 40-44% of women are raped or are
victims of attempted rape; 85% of working women have been sexually harassed in the work-
place; 25%-33% of women have been battered; 12%-15% of American women have been or
are prostitutes; and the average woman makes 59 cents for every dollar the average man earns.
44. In Feminine Discourse, supra note 23, at 26-27, MacKinnon noted that even such
conservative thinkers as Phyllis Schlafly find these statistics abhorrent and unacceptable. She
also pointed out, however, that Schlafly does not equate these problems with sex difference or
sex dominance.
45. See, eg., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (concluding, prior to the
enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, discussed infra note 47, that the employers'
policy of refusing to allow female employees to accumulate seniority during maternity leave
violated § 703(a)(2) of Title VII.); Mills v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 634 F.2d 282 (5th
Cir. 1981) (Union violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it refused to refer the
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consensus is not only that women should not be powerless, but also that
women should be equally "empowered" to enter and maintain jobs in the
workplace. Applying a power-spectrum construct, freedom from victim-
ization causes women to leave the realm of "powerlessness"; freedom to
enter and maintain jobs in the workplace causes women to become "em-
powered," the middle ground of the power construct. It is at this point
that power and equality most clearly coincide or, as Littleton theorizes,
that the issue of sex discrimination becomes the focus. Equality for wo-
men in the American workplace entails being allowed to enter and re-
main in that workplace to the same degree as men. Equality involves the
ideal that the "best person" for the job (rather than the "best man") is
hired. In addition, equality has come to include equal treatment of those
workers who engage in reproductive activity as a result of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act,46 which requires employers to treat pregnancy no
differently than any other disability. 47
Craft, Hishon, and Hopkins already had travelled beyond the realm
of powerlessness, through the middle ground of empowerment (that is,
beyond sex discrimination in hiring). They were stopped in their tracks
when they attempted to enter the upper end of the power spectrum-
when they attempted to become "powerful." Just as victimization com-
prises a negative form of power and entering the workforce coincides
with a somewhat neutral form of power, becoming "powerful" entails
entry into the realm of positive power: the power "to be." This positive
power, the power "to be," manifests itself in the forms of personal bene-
female plaintiff for a position as a heavy truck driver. The court affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that the plaintiff was qualified to be a truck driver, and was not given a referral by
the defendant solely because she was female.); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d
Cir. 1970) (Employer violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963 by paying male selector-packers of
glass 10% higher wages than female selector-packers. The court found that the two positions
were substantially the same, and that the company had not carried its burden of proof that the
pay differential was based on a factor other than sex.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 1981).
47. Another example of the attention given to women's particular needs in the workplace
is the response of several states to the need for parental leave policies. California currently has
a law that requires employers to provide a maximum of four months unpaid disability leave for
their pregnant female employees. This law was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 227 (1987). Eight other states also
require employers to provide some type of pregnancy leave. These states are Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio and Washington. Only Hawaii
and California, however, provide for at least partial payment of wages during this period and a
reemployment guarantee. Haase, Evaluating the Desirability of Federally Mandated Parental
Leave, 22 FAM. L.Q. 341, 344-45 (Fall 1988). Recently, bills were introduced in each House of
Congress (S. 249, 100th Cong., 1st sess. (1987) and H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st sess. (1987),
which would require certain employers to provide unpaid family leave (for both male and
female employees) after the birth or adoption of a child. Id.
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fits and benefits in relation to other people. The personal benefits of
power include the ability to command and receive a high price for serv-
ices rendered and thereby to enjoy a comfortable, if not opulent, lifestyle.
In relation to others, a person of power wields influence, exercises au-
thority, and often receives both respect from peers and deference from
those in positions of less power. In other words, a person with positive
power has the power to be rich, influential, and well-respected, and, per-
haps most importantly, to define the conditions under which other peo-
ple will or will not be allowed to share in this abundance.48 Such. a
person may be an executive, a political leader, a tenured professor, an
anchorperson at a major television news station, or a partner in a major
law or accounting firm.
While it can be argued that promotions to powerful positions them-
selves should be allocated on an "equal" basis-without regard to gender
or stereotypical notions as to gender-it is naive to think that the move-
ment of women into powerful positions is merely a question of "equal-
ity." Movement into the "club" 49 of the powerful is not accomplished as
easily as was the movement by women into the workplace. Although at
the time of women's movement into the workplace it was not self-evi-
dent, in retrospect it is clear that it was relatively easy for women to
prove their gender should not bar entry into certain job areas. 50 On the
48. MacKinnon extends the concept of power even further, noting that power entails
among other things, that when someone says "[tjhis is how it is," it is taken as being
that way.... [Tihe world is not entirely the way the powerful say it is or want us to
believe it is. If it appears to be, it is because power constructs the appearance of
reality by silencing the voices of the powerless, by excluding them from access to
authoritative discourse. Powerlessness means that when you say "This is how it is,"
it is not taken as being that way.
C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 164 (1983).
49. Littleton uses the "club" terminology to illustrate an entity that takes on an existence
apart from its individual members and thus may prevail in certain types of activities (e.g.,
sexist exclusions) even though many of its members may not subscribe individually to the
theory behind those activities. Littleton, supra note 22, at 1318 n.201. In an amicus brief filed
in support of Ann Hopkins by three committees of the New York City Bar, professional part-
nerships were referred to as having "a 'club-like' atmosphere" in which "some decision-makers
may choose to select 'one of their own,' and thereby exclude minorities and women from
joining their ranks." Brief of the Committees on Civil Rights, Labor and Employment Law,
and Sex and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, at 10, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (No. 87-
1167) [hereinafter Brief of Committees of NYC Bar] (citing Epstein, Encountering the Male
Establishment: Sex-Status Limits on Women's Careers in the Professions, 75 AM. J. Soc. 965,
968 (1970).
50. Compare Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 144 (1872) (noting that the "destiny" of a
woman is to become a wife and mother) with Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding that the employer's policy not to assign women to the position of
"switch-man" constituted sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII and that the employer
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other hand, as women attempt to rise to positions of power, a new set of
evaluation standards, based on intangible personal assets, is applied.
When looking for leaders in law firms, accounting firms, or newsrooms,
decisionmakers search for more than just physical ability or technical
competence. Personal attributes take on prime importance. Stereotypi-
cal notions of how persons of each gender should or will act (or look or
dress) then become determinative.
At this point, when women enter the realm of "positive power,"
male decisionmakers recognize (whether consciously or not) that their
own positions of power are threatened. Unlike entry-level positions,
which pose no threat to those already in power, the promotion of women
to positions involving prestige and influence is a direct threat to male
decisionmakers. In other words, women do not just want jobs-they
want their jobs. The tension at this level is not relieved by insistence
from a legal perspective that women be treated "equally." Here it must
be conceded that the issue is actual distribution of power. If men refuse
to let women into these positions, the reason is not simply that they feel
women do not deserve or cannot perform well in these positions. The
questions go beyond whether an "equally competent" male would be
promoted under the same circumstances. A new question arises whether
men will in fact allow women to enter this realm in equal numbers.
Equality theory assumes that men and women are intrinsically equally
competent to perform certain tasks (for example, administering a law
firm). Equality theory in and of itself, however, is not forceful enough to
withstand obstacles thrown up by men who will not promote women
considered either "too feminine" 51 or "too masculine" 52 because this the-
ory does not recognize that issues other than actual competence may in-
fluence employment decisions. Equality theory thus cannot adequately
address the obstacles encountered by women seeking high positions in
their professions because it ignores the basic ingredient of "power." Per-
sons of power in a society or profession define the qualities individuals
must possess to rise to similar positions. 53 As demonstrated in Part II,
failed to establish that being male was a bona fide occupational qualification for the position,
notwithstanding the fact that the job occasionally required lifting equipment in excess of thirty
pounds and working alone late at night) and Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1981) (Employer refused to promote the plaintiff to Vice President of International Opera-
tions, claiming that its South American clients would not do business with a female. The court
rejected this defense, ruling that not even the preferences of foreign nations could "compel the
non-enforcement of Title VII." Id. at 1277).
51. As seems to have been the case for Hishon.
52. As was obviously the case with Hopkins.
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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current definitions of "power" attributes are imbued so deeply with sex
stereotyping that it is virtually impossible in many situations for wo-
men 54 to meet these criteria.
The Craft and Hopkins cases illustrate this tension. In both cases,
the female plaintiffs ostensibly were held to the same standards that
males were required to meet. Craft's employer claimed that she failed to
satisfy personal appearance criteria applied to both male and female
newscasters. Hopkins' employer claimed that she lacked the interper-
sonal skills necessary for male or female partners. In both cases, the
employers clearly relied on stereotypical notions of how women should
look and act.55 In Hopkins, for example, the Supreme Court pointed to
the blatant and subtle sexist overtones of the promotion criteria as ap-
plied to the plaintiff.5 6 Despite the fact that both decisionmaking
processes were laden with stereotyping, the courts tied a finding of liabil-
ity not to the discrimination inherent in the stereotyping process, but
rather to a showing that the purportedly neutral reasons articulated by
the employers (Craft's poor clothing aptitude and Hopkins' poor inter-
personal skills) would have resulted in negative employment decisions
even if these women had been men.57
54. This is not to say that no woman will be promoted to positions of power, but rather
that women will continue to be required to do everything far better than the average male in
order to be treated the same as that male.
55. See supra notes 17-19.
56. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1793. See also id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At other
times, however, the hope that the courts (also currently male-dominated) would even be able
to recognize sex stereotyping has been somewhat dim. Consider for example, the following
explanation by a district court judge as to why Elizabeth I-ishon should not be allowed to
pursue her claim against King & Spalding:
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is, in fact,
nothing less than a "business marriage" for better or worse. Just as in marriage
different brides bring different qualities into the union-some beauty, some money,
and some character-so also in professional partnerships, new mates or partners are
sought and betrothed for different reasons and to serve different needs of the partner-
ship. Some new partners bring legal skills, others bring clients. Still others bring
personality and negotiating skills. In both, new mates are expected to bring not only
ability and industry, but also moral character, fidelity, trustworthiness, loyalty, per-
sonality and love. Unfortunately, however, in partnerships, as in matrimony, these
needed, worthy and desirable qualities are not necessarily divided evenly among the
applicants according to race, age, sex or religion, and in some they just are not pres-
ent at all.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Employment Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1305 (N.D. Ga.
1980).
57. Admittedly such a showing can at times be difficult. In Craft, the district court re-
fused to find that the news station had treated the plaintiff in a manner that differed in any way
from its treatment of male anchors. The court blamed Craft's demotion on her "below-average
aptitude in matters of clothing and makeup" and her "attitude that her appearance was not
critical to her success as an anchor." 572 F. Supp. at 878. On the other hand, in Hopkins, the
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An appropriate alternative theory in these cases will accomplish two
goals. First, an employer will suffer some legal cost for allowing stereo-
typed notions to govern its promotion practices. The prevalence of stere-
otyping in the decisionmaking process, once proved, will establish a Title
VII violation. For the purpose of determining a remedy, the burden will
then shift to the employer to show that the female candidate would have
been denied promotion or fired absent the stereotyping. In other words,
the employer must show that the female candidate in question received
the same treatment as any male candidate would have received under the
same circumstances. This approach is designed to combine the "power"
and "equality" theories by dismantling the stereotyping framework of
many employment settings while at the same time preventing unqualified
candidates from entering the higher ranks of the workforce. A detailed
discussion of the prevalence of stereotypes in the workplace and of the
current doctrinal approach to employment discrimination cases that fol-
lows is necessary as a background for further explanation of this theory.
II. Sex Stereotyping in the Workplace
Both Craft and Hopkins clearly illustrate the courts' discomfort
with the concept of sex stereotyping. In Hopkins, controversy sur-
rounded the weight allocated by the district court to the testimony of Dr.
Susan Fiske, an expert in the field of sex stereotyping. 58 Dr. Fiske cited a
variety of psychological studies59 documenting "that men evaluating wo-
men in managerial occupations sometimes apply stereotypes which dis-
Supreme Court found that discriminatory animus had indeed played a motivating part in the
decision not to promote the plaintiff. The Court placed on the defendant the heavy burden of
separating obviously stereotyped attitudes from gender-neutral perceptions about her interper-
sonal skills. 109 S. Ct. at 1795.
58. In its Brief to the Supreme Court, Price Waterhouse referred to Dr. Fiske's testimony
as only "gossamer evidence" and criticized her for failing to focus on the "actual behavior" of
Hopkins at the accounting firm. Brief for the Petitioner at 35a-36a, Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. This attempted
devaluation of the role of psychological studies in sex discrimination cases prompted the
American Psychological Association (the "APA") to file an amicus curiae brief in which it
outlined the extent and quality of sex stereotyping research and the general acceptance of such
research in the scientific community. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Asso-
ciation in Support of Respondent, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (No.
87-1167) [hereinafter Brief for APA]. The APA noted that five decades of research in the area
had yielded "an internally valid pattern of consistent, mutually confirmatory findings as well
as considerable convergence across time, about the judgmental and behavioral consequences of
sex stereotypes, including in the employment setting." Id. at 9-10.
59. These are but a few of the myriad of studies in this area which have been conducted
over the last 15-20 years. In its Brief the APA noted that some 12,689 articles on human sex
differences had been published between 1967 and 1982 and that over 300 articles on sex stere-
otyping had appeared from 1974-1987. Brief for APA, supra note 58, at 7 n.8.
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criminate against women." 60 Studies of this nature are telling in their
descriptions of the characteristics and personality traits usually attrib-
uted both to men and to women. The stereotyped characterization of
males typically matches the common perception of "good managers,"
while the stereotyped view of women is exactly the opposite.
A stereotype61 has been defined as a "shared belief or set of beliefs
only partially or not at all true about a group of people." 62 Stereotypes
involve a "set of attributes ascribed to a group and imputed to its individ-
ual members simply because they belong to that group."'63 Individual
women attempting to achieve positions of leadership and power in the
workplace typically encounter a variety of stereotypes that project barri-
ers to their advancement."
A. The Context
The complicated dynamics of sex stereotyping in the workplace are
best explained using a hypothetical case. Kate, a young lawyer, applies
for admission into the partnership for which she works as an associate
attorney. Her colleagues John and Jim apply for partnership the same
year. The law firm specializes in personal injury litigation. The creden-
tials and background of all three applicants demonstrate qualification for
promotion in terms of length of service and number of hours worked.
The firm's four senior partners (all male) examine the credentials of the
applicants and speak with their colleagues, clients, and the staff members
who have worked closely with each candidate. Partner A votes against
Kate because, as he has repeatedly stated in the past, he just would not
60. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
61. The term "stereotype" has been chosen for this Article as it is the term used in the
Hopkins case. In her recent insightful article on professional women, Professor Deborah
Rhode has distinguished three levels of "unconscious gender bias": "(1) prototypes, the
images associated with members of a particular occupation; (2) schema, the personal charac-
teristics and situational factors that are used to explain conduct; and (3) scripts, definitions of
appropriate behavior in a given situation." Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1188 (1988).
62. Gutek, Introduction, in SEX ROLE STEREOTYPING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POL-
ICY 3 (B. Gutek ed. 1982). It has been noted that "[s]tereotypes, like laws, usually persist even
after the realities have changed." C. TAVRIS & C. OFFRIR, THE LONGEST WAR: SEX DIFFER-
ENCES IN PERSPECTIVE 20 (1977).
63. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5 RESEARCH IN ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 269, 271 (1983), cited in Brief for APA, supra note 58, at 8 n.ll. In
reality, the prominent issue in sex stereotyping cases is not whether the stereotypes may have
some basis in truth, but rather whether these notions about a group (whether true or false) are
applied indiscriminately to individual group members.
64. Ruble, Cohen & Ruble, Sex Stereotypes: Occupational Barriers for Women, 27 AM.
BEHAV. Sci. 339, 351 (1984).
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feel comfortable having a woman in a leadership position in his firm.
Partner B has not had the opportunity to work closely with Kate,
although he has had several "informal" discussions about her with John,
the associate with whom he works most often. 65 Partner B votes against
Kate because he assumes that her style of dealing with clients will be too
"personalized"; that she will become so emotionally involved with their
stories that she will be unable to weigh objectively whether a certain case
will be of any value to the partnership. Partner C votes against Kate
because he feels that she is too hard-driving and demanding once she
takes on a case and thus lacks the interpersonal skills necessary to enable
her to motivate effectively staff and other colleagues.66 Partner D sup-
ports Kate. He informs his colleagues that he has consistently en-
couraged her to "lighten up," not to take everything so seriously and to
become more "demure" in her dealings with other people. With a 3-1
vote against her, Kate is not promoted to partner. Her colleague John,
himself a very ambitious and intense worker, is promoted. Her colleague
Jim receives negative votes from Partners B and C, but these votes are
based on his careless handling of a case on which he worked with these
two partners rather than on any perceived deficiencies in his personality.
This example illustrates the multidimensional character of sex stere-
otyping. Stereotypes are imposed externally by a number of parties who
have direct or indirect influence on the decisionmaking process. These
parties include not only the candidate's employer, but also the candi-
date's colleagues, 67 staff,68 and clients.69 This stereotyping may consist
65. Studies indicate that the possibility of bias based on stereotypical notions increases
when no information or only ambiguous information is available as to the actual performance
of an employee. Ruble, Cohen & Ruble, supra note 64, at 352. See also Brief for APA, supra
note 58, at 23-25 ("Stereotyping is most likely when decisionmakers have available a paucity of
information.") (commenting on the fact that some of Hopkins' critics knew her only slightly).
66. Kate's "weaknesses" of being too emotional and too abrasive specifically reflect the
results of a survey by the American Bar Association Journal, in which male lawyers were
asked to articulate what they perceived to be the major weaknesses of female lawyers. 69
A.B.A. J. 1384 (Oct. 1983), cited in Brief of Committees of NYC Bar, supra note 58, at 9.
67. See MILWID, WHAT You GET WHEN You Go FOR IT 171 (1987) (discussing stud-
ies that indicate that people seem to gravitate toward, trust, and feel safe with someone whom
they feels shares their personal characteristics); Rhode, supra note 61, at 1190 (discussing the
problems of the plaintiff in Hishon who was denied partnership in a major Southern law firm
partially because she did not "fit in" with her colleagues); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 70 (dis-
cussing that men generally are more comfortable with other men than with women).
68. See Ely, Attitudes Toward Women and the Experience of Leadership in WOMEN'S
CAREERS 65 (1988). Ely discusses findings that subordinates' stereotyped notions about sex
roles influence the subordinates' perceptions of a leader's abilities.
69. Philip A. Lacovara, President of the Washington, D.C. Bar Association, wrote re-
cently of "the belief [shared among lawyers]-now withering but not dead-that most male
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of a secretary who claims she cannot work for women70 or of a partner
who claims that women do not have what it takes to be partner.71 It can
also take the more complex form of colleagues or decisionmakers believ-
ing that a certain trait (e.g., being "hard-driving") is a requirement for
effective management, but that there is something perverted about a wo-
man who exhibits such a trait. A further complication occurs because
some of these parties (i.e., the partners) also have stereotyped notions of
what other parties (e.g., clients) prefer in the work context. 72
An often overlooked detrimental effect of such sex stereotyping is
that women so subjected may internalize the stereotypes. This internal-
ization may result in lowered self-esteem as well as behavior alterations
designed to compensate for the perceived weaknesses related to her gen-
der.73 For example, Kate may overcompensate by being hard-driving in
order to dispel the commonly held belief that women are not as ambi-
tious as men. 74
B. The Stereotyping Process
Most stereotyping involves a two-step process: categorization and
attribution.75 The first step is the actual categorization of individuals
into groups, usually expressed as opposites (e.g., male-and female, black
and white, old and young).76 The second step involves the attribution of
certain traits (e.g., personality characteristics, intentions, goals, motiva-
tions, attitudes) to persons by virtue of the group into which they have
been categorized.
Sex stereotyping in the workplace is embedded in a complicated ma-
trix of interlocking beliefs77 that reflect this two-step process.. Initially
clients are more comfortable dealing with male lawyers." Lacovara, Mothers in the Law Of-
fice, 3 THE WASH. LAWYER 6 (Nov./Dec. 1988).
70. A surprising result in a recent study of the perceptions of men and women in leader-
ship roles was that even "liberal" women expressed as much discomfort in a group with a
female leader as did "conservative" men. These women were also as positive in their evalua-
tion of male-led groups as were the "conservative" men. See Ely, supra note 68, at 77.
71. The Hopkins record includes evidence that one partner stated on at least one occasion
that he could never vote for a female partner. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1783.
72. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
73. Rhode, supra note 61, at 1189-90.
74. One of the Price Waterhouse partners, in commenting on Hopkins' aggressiveness,
observed that "she may have overcompensated for being a woman." 618 F. Supp. at 1116-17.
75. Ruble, Cohen & Ruble, supra note 64, at 340.
76. Anthropological studies have revealed the interesting phenomenon that "everywhere
in the world masculinity is considered the opposite of femininity, even when the traits and jobs
associated with males in one culture are those associated with females in another culture." C.
TAVRIS & C. OFFRIR, supra note 62, at 16.
77. The discussion that follows comprises an overview of some of the many studies rele-
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employees are viewed in the polarized categories of "male" as opposed to
"female."' 78  Then, particular traits are attributed to each category.
Many of the stereotyped attributes assigned in this array are couched in
terms of the following questions:
a) What is "women's work" versus "men's work"?
b) What are "feminine" versus "masculine" personality traits?
c) What are "feminine" versus "masculine" management and leader-
ship styles?79
For women who attempt to move into the higher ranks of the workplace,
an intertwining set of beliefs is also operative. These beliefs are based on
the categorization of executives as "effective" or "ineffective" and the
attribution of perceived gender and personality traits to each of these
categories. Questions that give rise to consistent, stereotyped responses
in this field include:
a) Are effective executives more likely to be male or female?
b) Which personality traits are most typical of effective executives?
c) Which management and leadership styles are most effective?
As one might expect, the stereotyped responses to these latter three ques-
tions tend to favor males substantially over females. This leads to the
final complication for women in their pursuit of the higher echelons of
the workplace: the clash between being a "woman" (with all its attendant
stereotyped attributions) and behaving like a man. A third level of nega-
tive stereotyping arises in light of this attempted role reversal.
(1) "Women's Work, " "Men's Work, " and Leadership
In every society there appears not only a polarization of the con-
cepts of "male" and "female," but also a division of occupations along
sex lines. 80 The dichotomy in Western culture clearly reflects a percep-
tion of the male as the dominant, self-confident leader and the female as
vant to the process and effects of sex stereotyping. Equally extensive discussions of these and
other studies are found in Rhode, supra note 61, at 1187-92 and in Taub, Keeping Women in
Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345,
349-61 (1980).
78. Art, religion, and the physical and social sciences constantly explore and challenge
the notion that "male" and "female" are polar opposites. As noted earlier, however, the pro-
cess of stereotyping initially involves dividing individuals into categories that are easy to un-
derstand and, in the case of most individuals, easy to recognize. Ruble, Cohen & Ruble, supra
note 64, at 340.
79. The obvious reaction of a rational human being to the structure of these questions is
that roles, occupations, and traits cannot always be tortured into one of these two categories.
As the studies discussed infra will indicate, however, many people are not only accepting of
but also feel quite confident in their ability to deal with this separation by gender.
80. C. TAVRIS & C. OFFRIR, supra note 62; Linton, Status and Role, in SEX DIFFER-
ENCES 171-74 (P. Lee & R. Stewart eds. 1976).
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the docile, gentle follower.81 Men occupy lucrative positions of power
and prestige in our society while women dominate lower-paid occupa-
tions related to nurturing, caring, and service.82 Typically, doctors, law-
yers,83 politicians, and business leaders are men, while nurses, elementary
school teachers, and librarians are women.84
A variety of theories-biological, psychological, and social-have
attempted to explain the evolution of the phenomenon of male domi-
nance in the more prestigious, powerful, and lucrative positions in the
workforce. For purposes of this discussion, the salient issue is not the
manner in which this state of affairs has developed, but rather the effect it
has on current thinking about the appropriateness of men and women in
certain occupations.
Studies indicate that the actual distribution of men and women in
occupational categories profoundly affects the perception of who should
in fact perform certain types of work. 5 In other words, the more men
there are in a job (e.g., lawyers), the more common is the perception that
the job (practicing law) is "man's work. ' '8 6 Following from this percep-
tion is the conclusion that the job is thus inappropriate for women.8 7
81. Prather blames the current status of women in thd workplace on the deeply embed-
ded images of women as "sex objects" and "servants." As sex objects, women gravitate to-
ward occupations in which they are valued for their appearance (e.g., actress, hostess).
Attractive women are not taken seriously in the workplace while unattractive women typically
lack the self-confidence necessary to succeed in a career. As servants, women tend toward the
nurturing, helping occupations and are used to working for little or no money as volunteers.
Prather, Why Can't Women Be More Like Men?, 15 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 172, 173-75 (1971).
82. Ruble, Cohen & Ruble, supra note 64, at 341-42.
83. Even in the professions in which women have managed to gain entry, they tend to
occupy the less prestigious sectors of the profession. In a recent comparative study of women
in the legal profession throughout the world, Menkel-Meadow observed that women tend in
every country to cluster in the "lowest echelons" of the legal profession, even though the form
of practice in that echelon may differ from country to country. Menkel-Meadow, The Com-
parative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The "Feminization" of the Legal Profession, 24 Os-
GOODE HALL L.. 897, 907-11 (1986).
84. Prather, supra note 81, at 175; Ruble, Cohen & Ruble supra note 64, at 342.
85. See studies described in Ruble, Cohen & Ruble, supra note 64, at 342. At the time
Hopkins was first nominated for partner at Price Waterhouse, the national accounting firm
had 662 partners, only seven of who were women. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
86. Miller, Gender Stereotyping and Perceptions of Occupational Success in WOMEN AND
WORK: SELECTED PAPERS 73 (1985).
87. Eichner describes two ways in which the exclusion of women from certain jobs is
accomplished through job stereotyping. Some jobs, she noted, are "mischaracterized" so that
the job appears to require male traits and physical characteristics (e.g., height and weight
requirements)., Other jobs, such as the practice of law, are "misstructured" so that they can
only be performed by those having the lifestyle characteristic of men in our society (long
hours, substantial travel, night work, constant overtime). Eichner, Getting Women Work That
Isn't Women's Work Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE
L.J. 1397, 1401-04 (1988).
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Numerous studies have shown that candidates for any job or position are
evaluated most favorably if the job or position is viewed as one appropri-
ate for their gender. 88
For women attempting to move into positions of power in the
workforce, this basic concept of "women's work" includes the notion
that leadership positions per se are inappropriate for women. Thus,
many women striving for upper level promotions will suffer the same fate
as Kate, when Partner A voted against her. Partner A perceives the no-
tions of "female" and leadership position as incompatible. Partner A's
thought process does not involve the second step of stereotyping (attribu-
tion). He reaches his decision based on categorization alone. The logic
of his position is clear and straightforward: Management and leadership
are "men's work." Kate is a woman. Therefore, Kate cannot perform in
a management or leadership position.
A telling study of ninety-five bank supervisors indicates that Partner
A's attitude is not unique. The supervisors were asked to make promo-
tion decisions on the basis of hypothetical personnel files in which the
gender of equally qualified applicants was varied. The supervisors were
far more likely to promote men than women. They also rated male appli-
cants more favorably than females in terms of their potential for cus-
tomer and employee relations. 89 The study also sought the reaction of
the supervisors if another supervisor requested the termination or, as a
less preferable alternative, the transfer of a subordinate who had per-
formed poorly. If the supervisor requesting the action was male, the ter-
mination request was most likely to be honored. If the supervisor was
female, a transfer (rather than termination) of the subordinate was rec-
ommended.90 The study noted that "[o]ne speculative interpretation of
these findings is that subjects had greater confidence in the ability of a
88. See studies cited in Ruble, Cohen, & Ruble, supra note 64 at 344. See also Ely, supra
note 68, at 67 (discussing findings that persons with conservative notions about women's roles
in the workplace are uncomfortable when they encounter women in nontraditional leadership
roles).
89. Rosen & Jerdee, Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 59 J. OF
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9, 11 (1974). It is unfortunate that many of the major studies in the
arena of sex stereotyping were performed prior to the 1980s. An argument can be made that
the makeup of the workforce has changed appreciably since that time, as has general sensitivity
to gender issues. On the other hand, the character of responses reported by such a highly
sophisticated firm as Price Waterhouse, as recently as 1986-87, indicate that these studies may
still reflect attitudes that have not disappeared entirely from the workplace. In its Brief to the
Supreme Court, the APA noted that one recent study of male MBA graduates revealed that
their attitudes toward women executives were as negative in the 1980s as they had been in the
1970s. Brief for APA, supra note 58, at 13 n.20, (citing Dubno, Attitudes Toward Women
Executives: A Longitudinal Approach, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 235 (1985)).
90. Rosen & Jerdee, supra note 89, at 12.
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male supervisor than a female supervisor to appraise the seriousness of a
performance problem."91
Equally debilitating for women seeking positions of leadership and
power is the stereotypical notion that any interaction between men and
women "naturally" results in men being in the dominant position. A
1982 study of ninety-five managers92 indicated that men are generally
assumed to hold higher positions than women. In this study, the same
"script" was presented to each of the respondents. The script involved
two employees of the same corporation, one who eventually convinced
the other to adopt a certain plan of action. The gender of the parties in
the dialogue was varied among the scripts distributed to the different re-
spondents. The respondents were then asked a number of questions
about the perceived corporate position, personality, and effectiveness of
the parties. In those cases in which the "influencer" was male and the
"target" was female, the influencer was usually perceived as holding a
higher corporate position relative to the target. When the influencer was
female and the target male, the females were significantly less likely to be
perceived as holding higher positions. Additionally, a female influencing
a male was seen as far less "powerful" than a female influencing another
female or a male influencing either a female or a male.93
(2) "Feminine" Personality Traits, "Masculine" Personality Traits, and the
Traits of an Effective Executive
While Partner A refused to vote for Kate's promotion simply be-
cause she was a woman, Partner B's decisionmaking was somewhat more
complex. Partner B attributed certain personality traits to Kate based on
her gender. He then compared these traits with the traits he perceived as
requisite for a good leader, manager, and litigator. Because the "femi-
nine" traits of nurturing and compassion did not match his stereotype of
"effective managing partner" traits, Partner B concluded that Kate
should not be promoted.
91. Id. Another interesting portion of this study indicated that some stereotypes may
work against men, particularly men who are devoted to their children and family life. When
the managers were asked to approve a leave of absence to care for small children, they found
the leave far less appropriate when the hypothetical employee requesting the leave was a male
rather than a female. Id at 12-13.
92. Wiley & Eskilson, Coping in the Corporation: Sex Role Constraints, 12 J. OF APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1982).
93. Id. The APA noted that "even when behavior is held constant in carefully controlled
laboratory conditions, males are seen as more influential, more confident, and somewhat more
deserving of respect than women .. " Brief for APA, supra note 58, at I1 (citing Taylor,
Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, Categorical and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyp-
ing, 36 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 778 (1978)).
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In what has been referred to as the "definitive work on sex-role ste-
reotypes," 94 Broverman measured the degree to which various personal-
ity traits were perceived as typical of men or of women. 95 Adjectives that
consistently were viewed as describing "male" traits included the follow-
ing: aggressive, independent, unemotional, objective, not easily influ-
enced, dominant, calm, active, competitive, logical, worldly, skilled in
business, direct, adventurous, self-confident, ambitious.96 Adjectives rep-
resenting "female" traits included: talkative, does not use harsh lan-
guage, tactful, gentle, aware of other's feelings, religious, neat, quiet,
easily expresses tender feelings, very strong need for security.97 Brover-
man's study also showed that the qualities associated with one sex tended
to be the reverse of those associated with the other sex98 and that "male"
qualities generally were rated as more positive.99
Another commonly cited study, the 1978 Bem Sex Role Inven-
tory, 100 lists a similar group of perceived "male" and "female" traits.
Adjectives and phrases describing males include: self-reliant, of strong
personality, defends one's beliefs, forceful, independent, analytical, ath-
letic, possessing leadership abilities, assertive, willing to take risks. '0' Fe-
males are perceived as yielding, loyal, cheerful, compassionate, shy,
sympathetic, sensitive to others' needs, flatterable, understanding. 10 2
As these adjectives indicate, and as numerous studies have con-
firmed, 10 3 the "masculine" traits generally are associated more strongly
94. A. HARRIMAN, WOMEN/MEN/MANAGEMENT, 87 (1985). As expected, many psy-
chologists do not attribute any credibility to discussions of sex differences. See discussion in
Lee, Psychology and Sex Differences, in SEX DIFFERENCES 359 (1976).
95. Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A
Current Appraisal, 28 J. OF Soc. CHANGE 59 (1972) [hereinafter Sex-Role Stereotypes].
96. Id.
97. Id. An earlier study (1936) of sex differences revealed findings similar to those of the
later research. Lewis Terman (creator of the Stanford-Binet IQ Test) and Catherine Cox Miles
engaged in a systematic study of sex differences from which they concluded as follows:
The males directly or indirectly manifest the greater self-assertion and aggressive-
ness; they express more hardihood and fearlessness, and more roughness of manners,
language and sentiments. The females express themselves as more compassionate
and sympathetic, more timid, more fastidious and aesthetically sensitive, more emo-
tional in general ... , severer moralists, yet admit in themselves more weakness in
emotional control and (less noticeably) in physique.
Terman & Miles, Sex and Personality: Studies in Masculinity and Femininity in SEX DIFFER-
ENCES, supra note 80, at 363.
98. Sex-Role Stereotypes, supra note 95. See also C. TAVRIS & C. OFFRIR, supra note 62,
at 16.
99. Sex-Role Stereotypes, supra note 95.
100. S. BEM, THE SHORT BEM SEX ROLE INVENTORY (1978).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The APA described gender-related stereotypes as follows: "men are thought to be
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in our society with good mental health. 104 Consequently, these traits are
viewed (by both males and females) as being those to which a mature
adult should aspire.,0 5
These stereotypes are laden with a variety of internal and external
inconsistencies. The labeling of certain traits as "masculine" or as "femi-
nine" leads easily to the misperception that most men possess most of the
masculine personality traits and most women possess most of the femi-
nine personality traits. In reality, a substantial number of people exhibit
some combination of these traits. A commonly accepted classification of
personality types involves measuring the predominance in individuals of
the "masculine" and "feminine" traits against a mean or median. Indi-
viduals who exhibit above-median degrees of masculine as well as femi-
nine traits are classified as "androgynous" while those who exhibit
below-median degrees of both types of traits are referred to as "undiffer-
entiated."10 6 In a study in which sixty-six middle-aged career women
evaluated their personal exhibition of "masculine" and "feminine" traits,
thirty-eight of the women ended up in the "androgynous" or "undifferen-
tiated" categories while only twenty-eight fell clearly into either the
"masculine" or "feminine" categories.10 7
The notion that male qualities are positive and thus more desirable
than female qualities also falters upon closer examination. Many of the
qualities that are termed "male" persistently are themselves indicative of
competent, strong, independent, active, competitive and self-confident and women are thought
to be incompetent, weak, dependent, passive, uncompetitive, and unconfident." The APA
noted that "persons of both sexes concur that those traits perceived to be related to men are
more valued than those related to women." Brief for APA, supra note 58, at 13 (citing Heil-
man, Sex Bias in Work Settings, 5 REs. IN ORG. BEHAV. 269 (1983).
104. See A. HARRIMAN supra note 94, at 108-09; Tyler, Sex Difference in Personality
Characteristics in SEx DIFFERENCES, supra note 80, at 396-98. Harriman points out that even
though recent focus has centered on "androgynous" persons-that is persons whose orienta-
tion seems to include a balance of "masculine" and "feminine" traits-it appears that androgy-
nous persons are considered mentally healthy because they possess a strong set of masculine
traits. In other words, it is the "masculinity" of androgynous people which contributes to
their emotional stability. A. HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 109. Carol Gilligan has criticized
the conclusion on the part of many theorists that masculine traits are more desirable and uses
this criticism as the starting point for her enlightening study of the different, but equally valua-
ble behavior modes of males and females. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 17
(1982).
105. Researchers found in one study that both men and women perceive males to have far
more advantages and far fewer disadvantages than females in our society. The researchers
concluded that their findings reflected in part "the generally more positive social attitudes
toward masculine qualities than feminine ones in our culture." Fabes & Laner, How the Sexes
Perceive Each Other: Advantages & Disadvantages, 15 SEx ROLES 129, 138 (1986).
106. See Wong, Kettlewell & Sproule, On the Importance of Being Masculine: Sex Role,
Attribution, and Women's Career Achievement, 12 SEx ROLES 757, 761 (1985).
107. Wong, Kettlewell & Sproule, supra note 106, at 762.
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a range of behavior10 8 rather than of one identifiable trait. For example,
studies typically refer to "aggressiveness" as a male trait. In the form of
effective assertiveness, aggressiveness may in fact be a desirable and posi-
tive quality. On the other end of the spectrum, however, "aggressive"
may be viewed as bullying, violent, and physically abusive. This manifes-
tation of aggressiveness probably would not appear on any person's list of
"desirable" qualities.
Feminist theorists have challenged the concept of "male is better"
from a variety of angles. A common approach involves recognition that
even if biological and sociological differences between men and women
do in fact exist, the issue is not the relative strengths or weaknesses of
these differences, but rather the failure of our society to recognize the
inherent value of traditionally "female" characteristics. 0 9 This ap-
proach defies the idea that male characteristics constitute the norm to-
ward which all mature adults should strive.
Despite the numerous criticisms that may be leveled against the sex
stereotyping of personality traits, an important phenomenon is that the
"masculine" traits are correlated strongly with success in the work-
place. 0 The study of sixty-six middle-aged career women revealed that
those women who exhibited a high degree of "feminine" traits (as
108. In an amicus curiae brief in support of Ann Hopkins submitted by the NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the ACLU, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, and a variety of
other groups devoted to ensuring equal rights for women, it was noted that the range of accept-
able behaviors for men is also much wider than the range for women. In support of this
proposition, the Brief cited stories of successful American corporate managers (all male) who
were described in a variety of terms, ranging from "humble" and "mild-mannered" to "tough"
and prone to "ego-shredding, criticism, insatiable demands, and Wagnerian fits of anger."
Brief of Amicus Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Educational Fund, American Civil Liberties
Union, Women's Legal Defense Fund, et al. at 19, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
1775 (1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter NOW Brief] (citing Peterson, A Humble Hero Drives
Ford to the Top, FORTUNE, Jan. 4, 1988, at 23; Flax, The Toughest Bosses in America, FOR-
TUNE, Aug. 6, 1984, at 18).
109. See, e.g., Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Post-structuralist Feminist Jurispru-
dence 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129, 1141-42 (1987); C. GILLIGAN, supra note 104, at 13-17;
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 968 (1984); Littleton,
supra note 22, at 1297.
110. See Nieva, Equity for Women at Work: Models of Change in SEX ROLE STEREOTYP-
ING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY 187-88 (1982). Nieva theorizes that the correlation
between masculine traits and success at work could stem either from the fact that men gener-
ally hold superior positions to women and thus that their traits are deemed superior, or that
"male" characteristics did in fact meet the demands of the workplace in the early days of
industrialization. She also points out that these early requirements for "rugged individualism"
are falling prey in the modern workforce to requirements for service activities, more "befit-
ting" feminine traits. Id. at 205. See also Case, Cultural Differences Not Deficiencies: An
Analysis of Managerial Women's Language in WOMEN'S CAREERS 41 (S. Rose & L. Larwood
eds. 1988), C. TAVRIS & C. OFFRIR, supra note 62, at 16-17.
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measured by the Bern Sex-Role Inventory) tended to be far less success-
ful in their careers than those women who exhibited a balance of "mascu-
line" and "feminine" traits, or in whom the "masculine" traits
predominated.11I
Power and leadership traits also tend to be more strongly correlated
with "masculine" traits than with "feminine" traits. In a study cited by
Dr. Fiske in the Hopkins case, 112 one researcher found that the personal-
ity traits ascribed to "successful middle managers" were far more similar
to characteristics typically ascribed to men than those typically ascribed
to women.11 3 Three hundred male middle line managers were asked to.
compare ninety-two descriptive terms with their own perceptions of the
traits of "men in general," "women in general," and the "successful mid-
dle managers."114 The researcher then calculated the degree to which
the "men in general" traits correlated with the "successful middle man-
ager" traits and the degree to which the "women in general" traits corre-
lated with the "successful middle manager" traits. For sixty of the
descriptive traits, the ratings of "successful middle managers" were more
similar to the ratings of "men in general" than of "women in general."
Descriptions found to be representative of this pairing included: "emo-
111. Wong, Kettlewell & Sproule, supra note 106, at 763. The study examined other fac-
tors that are generally brlieved to be predictive of females' successes in the workplace (marital
status, parental expectations, mother's employment status, age, employment history, educa-
tion) and found that "only education attainment and assessed masculinity in women were
significant predictors of women's career achievement." Id Additionally, the study found that
when education was not included in the analysis, the only significant predictor of success was
the subject's degree of "masculinity" or "femininity'." Id. at 763-64. Finally, the study ap-
praised those factors to which the women attributed their success. The "feminine" women
tended to attribute their success less to "internal" factors (such as ability and effort) than did
the "masculine" women. From this finding the researchers concluded that the "feminine"
women "feel less competent and less proud of their career accomplishment. Femininity seems
to be associated with an attribution pattern that tends to lower one's aspirations and career
striving." Id at 766.
112. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
113. Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management
Characteristics, 57 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 95, 99 (1973). A 1979 replication of this study
revealed few changes over time. See Massengill & Di Marco, Sex-Role Stereotypes and Requi-
site Management Characteristics: A Current Replication, 5 SEx ROLES 561 (1979). Both stud-
ies are discussed in A. HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 189-91.
114. Each manager was asked to rate the descriptive terms as they applied to only one of
the stereotype categories. For example, some managers received forms which instructed them
to rate the descriptive terms according to their characterization of "men in general." Others
received forms asking them to rate the characteristics of "women in general," and still others
received forms asking them to rate the characteristics of "successful middle managers."
Schein, supra note 113, at 96-97. The Descriptive Term Index used in the study was composed
from a variety of sex stereotype studies and was finalized after an independent study adminis-
tered to 24 male and female college students. Id. at 96.
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tionally stable, aggressive, leadership ability, self-reliant, (not) uncertain,
vigorous, desires responsibility, (not) frivolous, objective, well-informed
and direct."1 15 For only eight of the ninety-two items was there a
stronger pairing between "successful managers" and "women in gen-
eral." These descriptive pairings included " 'employee-centered' or 'con-
sideration' behaviors, such as understanding, helpful and intuitive.""' 16
For eighteen of the items there was no significant relationship between
sex stereotyping and managerial stereotyping. 117
An even more dramatic study, involving 884 male managers, was
conducted in 1976.118 The managers were asked to compare males and
females on sixty-four vocationally relevant characteristics that were
grouped into the following four scales: aptitude, knowledge, and skills;
interest and motivation; temperament; work habits and attitudes. As an-
ticipated, men were rated more favorably than women on all four
scales." 9 "With respect to temperament, men were viewed as better able
to cope with the stress and pressure of tough managerial roles. Women
were viewed as more emotional, timid, jealous, and sensitive to criticism,
as compared to men."' 120 Women also were viewed as less dependable
and less reliable employees.' 21
Even if the subconscious pairing of desirable leadership traits and
"masculine" traits is no more than a reflection of the fact that men cur-
rently dominate the upper echelons of the workplace,122 women continue
115. Id. at 98.
116. Id. at 100.
117. Id. at 98. Another interesting finding of Schein's study was that older managers (age
49 and above) showed a greater tendency to pair female traits with successful managerial traits
than did their younger counterparts. Schein concluded that
Older male managers may have more interaction with women for whom the role of
labor force participant is more salient than that of mother-homemaker. This age
effect interpretation implies that as more women become active participants in the
labor force, the increased experience with working women will reduce to some extent
the relationship between sex role stereotypes and requisite management characteris-
tics among all age groups. Consequently, this psychological barrier to women in
management will be lowered, thereby affording a greater opportunity for women to
enter into and advance in managerial positions.
Id. at 99-100.
118. Rosen & Jerdee, Perceived Sex Differences in Managerially Relevant Characteristics, 4
SEx ROLES 837 (1978).
119. Id. at 841.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 110. See also Eichner, supra note 87, at 1402. Eichner discusses the
phenomenon whereby jobs commonly performed by men are deemed to require "male" traits
in light of a comparison between the job of physician in the United States and the Soviet
Union. Physicians are typically male in the U.S. and typically female in the Soviet Union. In
the U.S., that job is perceived as requiring the rational detachment generally attributed to
(Vol. 41
to suffer (as Kate did at the hands of Partner B) because they are women
and as such are perceived as too "emotional" (timid, shy, gentle, etc.) to
be executives. Women also are perceived by many as employing strate-
gies and styles that are incompatible with effective leadership and
management.
(3) "Feminine" Strategies, "Masculine" Strategies, and Effective Leadership
Strategies
Stereotypical power strategies commonly thought to be used by
males include coercion, expert argument, and convincing information,
while women are perceived as employing more indirect and personal
strategies. 123 Indicative of these categories are the descriptions of "mas-
culine" as opposed to "feminine" strategies from a recent study of per-
ceptions of power strategies. The strategies associated with men
included: "argue and yell; claim superior knowledge or skill; state point
directly; use physical force; use reason and logic."1 24 "Feminine" power
strategies were described as: "act in subtle ways by suggestions and hints;
compromise; make appeal based on common group membership and
other shared attributes; make things difficult by being a nuisance; use
flattery, deceit, lies; plead, beg or pray."' 2 5 As is perhaps obvious from
the above descriptions,
[t]hose power styles and strategies that are most associated with being
perceived as powerful and competent, with being effective or persua-
sive, are also associated with being masculine.... On the other hand
those strategies that are perceived as being least effective and are least
associated with being powerful are those indirect and personal styles
commonly associated with femininity.126
Interestingly, while there is little argument that such sex stereotypes re-
garding power strategies and styles are prevalent, research has shown
males. In the Soviet Union, the job is perceived as requiring the nurturing and caring charac-
teristics generally attributed to women. Case cites studies that indicate that perceptions of
women's speech in managerial situations may be based on preconceived images of the charac-
teristics of their gender. "Since women are thought to be emotional, indecisive, submissive,
supportive and interpersonally oriented.., their speech is rated likewise. Similarly, since men
are seen as behaving aggressively, instrumentally, bluntly and decisively . . . , their speech is
also rated consistent with that role image." Case, supra note 110, at 43.
123. See, e.g., A. HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 204-07; Case, supra note 110, at 42-43;
French & Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150 (D. Cart-
wright ed. 1959); Gruber & White, Gender Differences in the Perceptions of Self's and Others'
Use of Power Strategies, 15 SEx ROLES 109 (1986); Johnson, Women and Interpersonal Power,
in WOMEN AND SEX ROLES 310-17 (1978).
124. Gruber & White, supra note 123, at 113 (Table I).
125. Id. at 112.
126. A. HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 207. See also Wiley & Eskilson, supra note 92, at 9
(discussing women's difficulties in coping with managerial and authoritative roles).
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that, in practice, men and women exhibit few differences in terms of their
leadership styles. 127
(4) "Masculine" Women in the Workplace
One temptation upon review of the above studies is to suggest that
women use this information to their advantage and simply adopt those
personality traits, leadership styles, and power strategies that are per-
ceived as "masculine." While some women may have accomplished this
feat successfully, 128 there are both philosophical and psychological diffi-
culties with this reasoning.
From a philosophical perspective, the adaptation of women to male
norms may operate only as a temporary solution to the problems women
face in the workforce. An obvious problem is that women are biologi-
cally different from men and, to date, are the only gender physically ca-
pable of bearing children. Sociologically, the task of child-rearing also
has fallen primarily to women. To force professional women to "be like
men" in order to succeed is tantamount either to forcing these women to
forego bearing children or forcing their children to adapt to growing up
without parents. The male norm is not adequate if women are to be
integrated fully into the workplace. This norm not only ignores the re-
sponsibility that all of society has to raise healthy children, but also ig-
nores the tremendous contributions that so-called "female" attributes
can make to the workplace. 129
From a psychological perspective, attempts by women to be "more
like men" can take a toll both in terms of women's own mental health
and of their acceptance in the workplace. Women who pursue careers
constantly are reminded that they have chosen a path that is "different"
for women. 130 The conflict created by this perception may affect a wo-
man's work performance. Work environments in which stereotyping is
prevalent may even contribute subtly to the inability of women to "mea-
sure up" to the demands of leadership positions.13 1 Studies of "tokens"
127. A. HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 195-200.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
129. See articles and treatises cited supra note 33.
130. This statement is easily proved by watching the advertisements that accompany an
evening of "prime time" television viewing. Women are invariably portrayed as either "sex
objects" or as cheerful housewives (or both!).
131. An interesting aspect of the Gruber & White study was that the same subjects who
characterized the various strategies as typical of men in general or women in general were also
asked to evaluate their own use of these strategies. Most of the subjects reported a significantly
lower personal use of any of these strategies than the use they perceived by men and women in
general. They perceived themselves as being "more diplomatic and reasonable" than the aver-
age man or woman. Gruber & White, supra note 123, at 117. The male subjects reported a
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indicate that such persons are alienated and isolated from their col-
leagues and even pressured into acting in stereotypical ways. 132 Low
self-esteem and poor job performance have been documented in numer-
ous cases of workers for whom their superiors held artificially low
achievement expectations. 33 One study even showed that women lead-
ers tended to fulfill the group's sex-based expectations by being less influ-
ential in groups that took a conservative view of women in leadership
roles. 134
Additionally, women who use power strategies typically associated
with the opposite sex may be deemed to be engaging in a type of behavior
which is "unnatural." 135 One study has shown that, even when men and
women engage in exactly the same power strategies, women using these
strategies are viewed as "colder" and less likeable than the men.' 36 This
study also pointed out that the power styles deemed effective for men
were deemed inappropriate for women, and that the power styles deemed
appropriate for women were "unreliable."' ' 37
significantly greater usage of power strategies in general than the female subjects. Id. at 116.
The males also reported that they used both types of power strategies whereas the females
tended not to use the masculine strategies. The researchers hypothesized that this reflected "a
tendency among males to feel freer to resort to more influence attempts and to use any effective
strategy, masculine or feminine to get their way.... Females, on the other hand, apparently
feel more constrained by sex role stereotypes than males and therefore are less likely to use
masculine-typed strategies." Id. at 119. Schein engaged in similar speculation after her study,
of the pairinig of management traits with sex stereotypes. She noted that women whose self-
image reflected the feminine stereotype may be reticent to engage those "masculine" traits
commonly associated with managers. Schein concluded that "[g]iven the high degree of re-
semblance between the perceived requisite management characteristics and characteristics of
men in general, women may suppress the exhibition of many managerial job attributes in order
to maintain their feminine self-image." Schein, supra note 113, at 99.
132. C. TAVRIS & C. OFFRIR, supra note 62, at 211-14. For a more extensive discussion of
the studies related to "tokens," see Taub, supra note 77, at 358-59. In its brief to the Supreme
Court, the APA noted that "[s]ingular or rare individuals [persons who are members of a
group which has little or no representation in the particular work environment] attract more
attention, are evaluated more extremely, are more likely to be perceived as enacting stereo-
typed roles, and are believed to have a greater, sometimes more disruptive, impact on the
group." Brief for APA, supra note 58, at 20.
133. Rhode supra note 61, at 1188-89. One survey of personnel directors indicated con-
sistently low expectations as to the effectiveness of women appointed as managers. A. HARRi-
MAN, supra note 94, at 190.
134.- Ely, supra note 68, at 76.
135. See A: HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 206, for a discussion of the perceptions by others
of individuals who utilize opposite-sex power strategies. But see supra note 106 and accompa-
nying text, which seems to indicate females exhibiting masculine traits are successful in
business.
136. Wiley & Eskilson, supra note 92, at 6.
137. Id at 9. See also infra note 140.
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Women have devoted many hours and much money to learning how
to be more assertive and aggressive, to speak and act "with power.1 38
Yet numerous studies have shown that even though "feminine" manage-
ment styles are deemed weaker and inadequate, women who are per-
ceived as using "masculine" management styles are, at best, deemed
ineffective and, at worst, resented and viewed as overbearing. 139 A wo-
man attempting to exert leadership and power thus could be left in a
double bind. "If she uses expert power, a more effective style for a man,
she will be viewed as acting in a deviant manner, and will be seen as less
effective than a man using the same strategy; if she uses reward power
she will be seen as acting in a stereotypically female manner, but will still
be seen as less powerful and less effective than the man.' 4
Ann Hopkins was characterized as a "macho" and "masculine" wo-
man who should "take a course at charm school."1 41 She was advised to
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry."' 142 She was also
criticized as being "tough-talking" and "a lady using foul language."' 143
The focus of most of this criticism seems to have been that she was a
138. See discussion in Case, supra note 110, at 42.
139. Id. at 55. See also Ely, supra note 68, at 77. But see supra note 106 and accompany-
ing text. A similar reaction occurred initially when women began to work in fields that were
traditionally relegated to males. The costs imposed on such women were both external-in the
forms of ostracism and even hostility-and internal-in the form of alienation, anxiety, and
self-doubt. See Nieva, supra note 110, at 200.
140. A. HARRIMAN, supra note 94, at 206. See also Rhode, supra note 61 at 1189; Brief of
APA, supra note 58, at 14-16. In the amicus curiae brief filed by the NOW Legal and Educa-
tional Defense Fund the "double bind" concept was referenced by a quote of Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick, in which she noted, "if a woman seems strong, she is called 'tough', and if
she doesn't seem strong, she's found not strong enough to occupy a high-level job in a crunch."
5 NEWS FOR WOMEN IN PSYCHIATRY 14, 14-15 (Oct. 1986) (reprinting speech of Jeane Kirk-
patrick given to the Women's Forum, New York City, 12/19/84), cited in NOW Brief, supra
note 108, at 10. Similarly, the report of a New York task force studying women in the court
system reported that "whereas aggressive behavior by male attorneys was rewarded or toler-
ated, it was viewed as inappropriate for female attorneys." Brief of Committees of NYC Bar,
supra note 49, at 8 (citing THE REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS 230-32 (1986)). In the plurality opinion in Hopkins, Justice Brennan referred to the
double-bind mode of thinking as placing women "in an intolerable and impermissible Catch-
22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they don't." Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
at 1791.
The "double bind" extends even to the manner in which a female professional presents
herself to the public. At KMBC, Christine Craft's news station, women who had soft feminine
hairstyles were told to wear more masculine clothes to establish credibility while women with
masculine hair styles were told to wear more feminine clothes lest they appear too aggressive.
Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214.
141. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1782.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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woman who acted too much like a man.' 44Christine Craft also was criti-
cized for her "masculine" ways of dressing and was encouraged to buy
clothes with more "feminine touches" that would articulate her "profes-
sional elegance."' 145 In our hypothetical, Partner C criticized Kate for
her "male" traits of being demanding and hard-driving and Partner D
encouraged her to be less intense and more "demure." In all of these
situations, the female worker is caught in the classic double bind-if she
is too "feminine" she will not succeed because feminine traits typically
are not correlated with success, 146 and if she is too "masculine" she will
not succeed because she will be perceived as engaging in deviant behavior
unbecoming to her gender. The question decisionmakers in these situa-
tions ignore is whether each woman is in fact qualified and competent for
the position she seeks. The approach described in Part IV of this article
is an attempt to refocus the attention of courts on individual competence
while at the same time preventing deeply embedded and pervasive sex-
stereotyping in the workplace to continue with impunity.
IMl. Sex Stereotyping in the Context of Title VII Cases
The studies described above indicate three commonly shared per-
ceptions about men and women in the workplace:
a) Management and leadership are "man's work."
b) The traits and leadership styles perceived as "masculine" are more
positive and desirable than those perceived as "feminine" and are more
closely connected with success, power, and leadership in the
workplace.
c) Women who exhibit "masculine" personality traits or use "mascu-
line" power strategies are deviant in both comportment and behavior.
In the example described in Part II, the partners' view of Kate was
the result of all of these stereotypes. Partner A assumed that a woman
could not do the "man's work" of being a law partner. Partner B attrib-
uted to her, by virtue of her gender, the "feminine" trait of compassion,
which is deemed to be less desirable in the workplace than certain male
144. The APA noted that Hopkins' supporters described her behavior in positive terms
associated with a competent partner ("outspoken, independent, self-confident, assertive and
courageous") while her critics had described her in "Iron Maiden" terms-"over-bearing, ar-
rogant, self-centered, and abrasive." Brief for APA, supra note 58, at 15. See also Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. at 1782-83 (descriptions of commentaries praising and criticizing Hopkins).
145. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214.
146. Compare these situations with that of the woman who applied to be a police officer in
Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (1984), aff'd on rehearing, 804 F.2d
1097 (9th Cir. 1986), but who was found to be "too much like a woman." Id. at 1165. See also
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1983) (police officer applicant
perceived to be "a very feminine type person who is apparently very weak in the upper body").
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traits. Partners C and D criticized her for exhibiting the "masculine"
trait of being hard-driving. Even though Partner D voted for her, his
commentary about her attitude gave credence to Partner C's assessment.
Finally, Kate's colleague Jim was not promoted, but the negative deci-
sion about him was related to his performance rather than to a stereo-
typed notion of his gender.
Despite the strength of criticisms leveled against stereotypical no-
tions of men and women, the salient point is that these notions are en-
trenched in the workforce and have both an internal and an external
effect on the achievement and promotion of women. The task of up-
rooting and dispelling these stereotypes falls to legislators, employers,
employees, parents, teachers, philosophers, artists, sociologists, lawyers,
anthropologists, and psychologists alike. Feminist legal theorists already
have made substantial contributions toward this project by engaging in a
restructuring of legal approaches on both a practical and theoretical
level. While it would be idealistic and naive to assume that the legal
system is the only, or even the most effective, tool available to eradicate
this dangerous form of sexism, there are a variety of incremental ways in
which the legal system can aid in the process of relieving sex stereotypes
of their power. 147 Part IV will outline one approach by advocating a
bifurcation of Title VII sex discrimination cases, combined with an allo-
cation of presumptions predicated on a recognition of the pervasiveness
of sex stereotypes in employment decisions. Part III examines the cur-
rent legal approach to discrimination based on sex stereotyping, with a
particular emphasis on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hopkins.
Both Christine Craft and Ann Hopkins encountered sex stereotyp-
ing in their workplaces. This stereotyping profoundly affected their rise
to positions of "power" in these workplaces. Although their cases were
decided under different legal theories, it is important to note that each
case revolved around disparate treatment of an individual "because of"
her sex.
In 1982, Ann Hopkins applied for admission as a partner in Price
Waterhouse, one of the nation's largest accounting firms. Hopkins was
the only woman among eighty-eight candidates under consideration. 48
At the time of her application, Hopkins had generated more business for
147. But see Brown, Parmet & Baumann, The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in
Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 573, 590-619 (1987), in which the authors
argue that current discrimination law relies on an ostensibly neutral, formalistic analysis, while
ignoring social context, and thus is inadequate to address meaningfully issues of gender
equality.
148. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
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the partnership and billed more hours than any of the other candidates,
yet she was not invited to join the partnership but rather was placed on a
one-year "hold," along with seventeen of the male candidates.149 All of
the male candidates placed on the one-year hold were renominated in the
following year. 150 Hopkins was not.151 When she inquired as to the basis
of her rejection, Hopkins was told that her difficulties in "interpersonal
skills"-most particularly her aggressive, tough, "macho" behavior-
had contributed substantially to her failure to attain acceptance into the
partnership.' 52
Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse, alleging that the accounting firm
had permitted stereotyped notions of women and appropriate "female"
behavior to play a significant role in the denial of her partnership appli-
cation. The District Court for the District of Columbia found that the
promotion decision had been impermissibly influenced by sex stereotyp-
ing in the partnership's evaluation process, but refused to direct that
Hopkins be promoted because she failed to prove that she had been con-
structively discharged. 53 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit affirmed the District Court on the question of liability,
but reversed the judgment that no constructive discharge had been
shown, and remanded the case for the determination of appropriate dam-
ages and relief.' 54 The Supreme Court reversed the district court's liabil-
ity determination, but only because Price Waterhouse was held to a
higher standard of proof than the Court deemed appropriate in Title VII
cases.' 55 As will be discussed later in this Part, the decision was still a
victory for Ann Hopkins.
In 1982, Christine Craft agreed to join KMBC-TV as a co-anchor
after making it clear that she did not intend to engage in the type of
149. "In a jointly prepared statement supporting her candidacy, the partners in Hopkins'
office showcased her successful 2-year effort to secure a $25 million contract with the Depart-
ment of State, labeling it 'an outstanding performance' and one that Hopkins carried out 'vir-
tually at the partner level.'" Id. at 1782. Of the 88 candidates who applied for partnership
status, 47 were accepted, 21 were rejected and 20 were placed on hold. Two of the candidates
were placed on a two-year hold, while Hopkins and 17 other (male) candidates were placed on
a one-year hold. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 462.
150. Of these one-year hold candidates, 15 were eventually admitted to the partnership.
Id.
151. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
152. Id. at 1782. Her supporters in the evaluation process made a variety of comments
about her personality traits that were also imbued with gender stereotypes. See supra note 17.
In addition, stereotypical comments about other women who sought promotion were admitted
by the court. 825 F.2d at 467.
153. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1122.
154. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473.
155. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1814.
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personal "makeover" which had been attempted by a former em-
ployer.' 56 Evidence indicated that she had been hired to "soften" the
image of the male co-anchor. 5 7 Soon after her initial broadcasts, Craft
was criticized for her clothing and was assigned several consultants and a
"clothing calendar" in an attempt to help her create an acceptable im-
age. 5 8 Viewer surveys of Craft remained negative and Craft was eventu-
ally reassigned to the less prestigious job of field reporter. 59
Craft sued Metromedia, the owner of the news station, on four
grounds. 160 On the Title VII count, Craft alleged that KMBC's appear-
ance standards were based both on stereotyped notions of how women
should look and dress and on stereotypical customer preferences.' 6' The
district court found that the station's appearance standards were not dis-
criminatory because they were "consistent with community standards"
and were applied evenly to male and female newscasters. 62
In each of these disparate treatment cases, the underpinnings of sex
stereotyping clearly were shown to exist. The question arising in any
case of this nature involves the role that evidence of sex stereotyping will
play in proving a violation of Title VII and in fixing an appropriate rem-
edy for the plaintiff.
156. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1208. When Craft joined CBS to host the "Women in Sports"
broadcasts, she was required to cut and bleach her hair and to wear heavy makeup on the air.
Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1208-09.
159. Id. at 1209. Craft claimed that she was told that she was removed as anchor because
she was "too old, too unattractive and not deferential enough to men." Id. However, the
district court refused to credit this testimony. Id.
160. See supra note 14.
161. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210.
162. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878. The district court relied primarily on the "grooming
code" cases under Title VII which have traditionally allowed great deference to an employer to
promulgate different codes for males and females provided such codes are designed to maintain
a business-like (as opposed to sexually provocative) appearance and meet accepted community
standards. Id. (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1975); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lanigan v. Bart-
lett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979)). For a discussion of the court's uncriti-
cal reliance on these cases, see Note, supra note 15, at 190-94. The author of this Note
suggests that, in grooming cases in which the factors at play are subjective (as opposed to
objective factors such as hair length), courts should engage in a "business necessity" type of
test that would "balance the right of the employer to run his business in a manner which he
perceives to be economically profitable against the harm resulting to the individual employee's
life-style as a result of the employer's decision." Id. at 108. The author believes that Me-
tromedia would still have been successful had such an alternative test been applied. Id.
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A. Proving Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII ,
Under Title VII it is an "unlawful employment practice.., to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individual's... sex."' 163 This
law permits a court that finds an employer has engaged intentionally in
an unlawful employment practice to enjoin the employer from engaging
in such practice. The court can then order "such affirmative action as
may be appropriate [including but not limited to] reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay, ... or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate."' 164 Additionally, the court may allow
attorney's fees for the "prevailing party."'165
The ultimate issue in a disparate treatment 66 case is whether the
defendant has discriminated intentionally against the plaintiff. 167 The
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
164. Id § 2000e-5(g).
165. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
166. "Disparate impact" cases deal with employer policies that perpetuate past discrimi-
nation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under the Griggs analysis, a facially
neutral employment policy may violate Title VII if it discriminates against a protected group,
and is not sufficiently related to job performance. Idt at 431. The plaintiff has the burden of
showing that the employer's policy, though neutral on its face, adversely affects a protected
group of which she is a member. Unlike disparate treatment cases, motive and intent do not
have to be proven. Whether the employer had good intentions in enacting the rule does not
matter if the rule discriminates against a protected group and is not related to a person's
capability to perform the job in question. Ide at 432.
167. As discussed below, courts typically require a showing that intentional discrimina-
tory treatment has resulted in a negative employment decision. One commentator argues that
Title VII embraces all discriminatory activity, whether or not it is "outcome determinative."
He points out that the Civil Rights Act fosters the right of individuals to be free of all "differ-
ent" treatment based on impermissible grounds, even if that treatment does not directly affect
final employment decisions. Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives,
and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 85, 86-90, 134 (1986).
As described in Part IV, this author adopts Stonefield's approach indirectly by espousing the
theory that an employer may violate Title VII and yet not be forced to provide equitable relief
to the plaintiff, if the employer can show that the same employment decision would have been
made absent the discriminatory behavior. A simple analogy best explains this approach. As-
sume that car A drives over a hill, speeding at 85 miles per hour, and hits car B, which is
making a left turn. In speeding, car A has already violated the traffic laws. If the driver of car
B attempts to sue the driver of car A for damages, however, the question is whether the illegal
action by car A "caused" the wreck. Suppose car B was running a red light when car A came
over the hill. Clearly, the illegal actions of both cars contributed to the result. A court would
be hard-pressed to hold that car A's illegal action was the only cause of the wreck. On the
other hand, if car B was making a legal turn, the illegal actions of car A will be considered the
legal cause of the damage to car B. If we assume that the employer who engages in sex stere-
otyping is the speeding car A, it is clear that the employer has already violated the law.
Whether this violation was the legal cause of negative employment decision does not relieve
the employer's responsibility for violating the law. The "outcome determinative" nature of the
employer's action is relevant to the question of relief ("damages") for the plaintiff.
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Supreme Court noted in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States 168 that disparate treatment occurs when an "employer sim-
ply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." 169 As the decisions following the
Teamsters case have evidenced, however, a showing of intentional dis-
crimination is not a "simple" process. Courts have engaged in increas-
ingly complex analyses of the terms "discriminate" and "because of,"
analyses that have caused them to forget the basic notion that semantic
interpretation is often not a science in itself, but rather a process for mak-
ing policy decisions.
The manner in which disparate treatment cases are adjudicated has
evolved as the courts, litigants, and attorneys have become more sophisti-
cated in dealing with employment decisions.170 Initially, disparate treat-
ment cases proceeded under the theory that a single reason motivated the
defendant's unfavorable treatment of the plaintiff.171 Through the use of
circumstantial or direct evidence, the plaintiff attempted to prove that
the reason underlying the employment decision was a discriminatory rea-
son as opposed to the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered by
the defendant as the "real" reason for the decision. As it became increas-
ingly apparent that most employment decisions are motivated by a
number of different reasons, some of which may be unlawful, some of
which are not, the courts developed the more complex causation analysis
that was employed in Hopkins. As the divergent concurring and dissent-
ing opinions in Hopkins indicate, however, there remains a fair amount
of overlap between the single motive analysis and the "mixed motive"
causation analysis.
(1) Single Motive Analysis
Single motive analysis is simply the theory that one reason-
whether legitimate or not-motivated the negative employment decision
at issue. No separate showing of causation is necessary in single motive
analysis because causation is inherent in the determination that a particu-
lar reason was the only determining factor behind a firing, failure to hire,
or failure to promote. This single motive is subject to proof by both cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence.
168. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
169. Id. at 335-36.
170. For discussions of the evolution of disparate treatment theory, see Stonefield, supra
note 167, at 105-23, and Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 301-311 (1982).
171. Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
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It was evident early on, however, that most disparate treatment
cases were not easily subject to proof by direct evidence. Recognizing
that such evidence of intentional discrimination is often unavailable or
under the sole control of the employer, 172 the United States Supreme
Court devised a method by which intentional discrimination could be
proved using circumstantial evidence. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 173 the Supreme Court set out the following three-step model for
proving intentional discrimination: 1) the plaintiff establishes a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination; 174 2) the burden shifts to the defendant to ar-
ticulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the business decision
that was made;175 and 3) if the defendant carries that burden, the plaintiff
must then show that the proffered reason was a mere "pretext" for dis-
crimination.176 A major purpose of this burden-shifting technique, as re-
fined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 177 is "to
frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have
172. See Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979).
173. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In Stonefield, supra note 167, at 108, the author points out that
this methodology, commonly attributed to McDonnell Douglas, was actually outlined first in
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198-214 (1973).
174. A prima facie case is established by showing that the plaintiff belonged to a protected
class, that she applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants, that she was rejected, and that the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants for the position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court
noted, in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977), that establishing
the prima facie case "serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection," the absence of a job vacancy
or the lack of qualifications by the applicant. See Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d
1552, 1556 (1Ith Cir. 1983). The prima facie case serves to raise an inference of discrimination
"because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978).
175. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (198 1), the Supreme Court confirmed that the defendant's burden at
this point is merely one of production, rather than one of persuasion. The defendant's articu-
lated reason must be "clear and reasonably specific." Id. at 258.
176. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. "Because of the employee's easy burden of
establishing a prima facie case and the employer's normal ability to articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, most disparate treatment cases turn on the plaintiff's
ability to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext
for discrimination." Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff
is not necessarily required to introduce new evidence in order to show pretext. The Supreme
Court noted in Burdine that the evidence introduced for the prima facie case may be consid-
ered by the trier of fact on the pretext issue and "there may be some cases where the plaintiff's
initial evidence, combined with effective, cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to
discredit the defendant's explanation." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
177. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."' 178  The burden of
persuasion, however, remains at all times with the plaintiff.1 79
The plaintiff will prevail in a circumstantial evidence case if she sat-
isfies the trier of fact "that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given
by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment deci-
sion,"1 80 but rather a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 8 ' She may do
this by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is "unworthy
of credence." 182 This method of proof has been described by one court as
"permitting the plaintiff to prove his case by eliminating all lawful moti-
vations, instead of proving directly an unlawful motivation."'' 83
In simpler terms, a single motive case proved by circumstantial evi-
dence proceeds along these lines: Plaintiff initially raises the inference
178. Id. at 255-56.
179. Id. at 257.
180. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 718 (1983)
(emphasis added). See also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 (usefulness of statistics to
show pretext). But see Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(argument of pretext ordinarily will fail if employer selects person he believes is most
qualified).
181. The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine paradigm does lend itself to situations in which
more than one reason may have contributed to the adverse employment decision. In a case
analyzed in accordance with this model, the court determined that the plaintiff's case showed
that the defendant's articulated reasons were pretextual in part-that is, that some but not all
of the articulated reasons were pretextual. In Germane v. Heckler, 804 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.
1977), the defendant proffered five reasons for the employment decision. The district court
found that two of these reasons were probably pretextual but that at least two of the reasons
probably were not pretextual. The court of appeals sustained the district court's finding that
the plaintiff had not proved that discriminatory intent was the "but for" cause for the decision.
804 F.2d at 368. See discussion of "but for" causation infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
182. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). One recent
case, Tye v. Board of Educ. of Polaris Joint Vocational School Dist., 811 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987), illustrates the use of direct evidence to prove the
falsity of the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason. To meet its burden of produc-
tion in this case, the defendant submitted a list of ten reasons for its decision to retain a male
rather than a female guidance counselor. Later in the trial, however, the school official solely
responsible for making the decision testified that the stipulated reasons were "reconstructed"
specifically for the litigation and that he in fact had no specific reason in mind when he made
the employment decision. Id. at 319. This direct testimonial evidence was accepted by the
court of appeals as proof of pretext; the plaintiff had "disprov[ed] all of the defendants' prof-
fered reasons." Id. at 318. It is important to note that the evidence presented by the plaintiff
in Tye was not direct evidence of discriminatory motive, but rather direct evidence that the
nondiscriminatory explanation given by the defendant was not the true reason why the plaintiff
was not retained. The plaintiff prevailed in this case without the need for any further proof
that she was the victim of intentional discrimination. In proving the falsity of the proffered
reasons, she had rebutted the defendant's presumption of nondiscrimination. This presump-
tion having been rebutted, the court was left with plaintiff's initial, non-rebutted, prima facie
case of discrimination.




that the employment decision in question was discriminatory in nature.
Defendant then articulates that Reason X (a nondiscriminatory reason)
was in fact the reason for the employment decision. If Plaintiff rebuts
Reason X by showing that the stated nondiscriminatory reason is merely
a pretext for disguising impermissible discrimination, the court is then
left with the original, now unrebutted showing of discrimination. 18 4
Plaintiff is deemed to have established that the adverse employment deci-
sion was made "because of" her gender.18 5
After the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model of proof was intro-
duced, some courts had difficulty deciding whether to apply this model in
cases in which direct evidence of bias actually was presented.1 86 The
Supreme Court had observed in McDonnell Douglas 18 7 that Title VII
fact situations vary and that the model outlined in that case was not
necessarily applicable to every fact situation. The Eleventh Circuit, after
examining district court cases in which McDonnell Douglas was rigidly
184. The Burdine Court noted that if the employer is "silent" in the face of the prima facie
case, "the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the
case." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
185. Christine Craft attempted to prove her discrimination case through circumstantial
evidence. She also attempted to use as direct evidence of discrimination the remark purport-
edly made by her superior that she was "too old, too unattractive and not deferential enough
to men." However, the district court refused to credit this testimony. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at
874. Craft offered documentary and witness testimony indicating that the clothing standards
at KMBC were stereotypical and were enforced more strictly for females than for males. Craft
showed that the female newscasters were required to meet a standard of "professional ele-
gance" while the male newscasters' standard was "professional image." Females were not
allowed to wear the same outfit on the air for extended periods of time (3-4 weeks) while men
could get away with wearing the same suit once or even twice a week. Craft was encouraged to
wear "designer" clothes. Media Associates advised its female on-air personnel with "soft"
hairstyles to dress in a masculine manner so as to reflect authority and credibility while fe-
males with short, mannish hairstyles were told to soften their clothing styles lest they appear
too aggressive. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214. The district court held the standards permissible in
light of prevailing community standards, and thus did not constitute a pretext for discrimina-
tion. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 876-79. The court accepted Metromedia's articulated nondiscrim-
inatory reason (Craft's low ratings in viewer polls) as the "real" reason for demoting Craft. Id.
186. These courts were perhaps confused by the discussion in Burdine regarding the allo-
cation of burdens. The Burdine Court described how the defendant's successful articulation of
a legitimate reason ordained that the plaintiff "now must have the opportunity to demon-
strate" pretext. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The Court went on to note that the plaintiff's
burden of persuasion at this stage "now merges with the ultimate burden" of proving inten-
tional discrimination, either directly or indirectly. Id. Noting this merger concept, courts
attempted to use the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model as a "Procrustean bed within which
all disparate treatment cases must be forced to lie." Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d
1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). See Perryman v. Johnson
Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 1983); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684
F.2d 769, 774 (1lth Cir. 1982).
187. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
March 1990]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
applied, concluded in Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, '8 8 that the
model "pertains primarily, if not exclusively, to situations where direct
evidence of discrimination is lacking." 1 89 The court stated that direct
evidence of discrimination, if accepted by the trier of fact, proved the
"ultimate issue of discrimination" rather than a mere prima facie case. 190
"If the evidence consists of direct testimony that the defendant acted
with a discriminatory motive, and the trier of fact accepts this testimony,
the ultimate issue of discrimination is proved. Defendant cannot refute
this evidence by mere articulation of other reasons; the legal standard
changes dramatically.... ,9
The important function of direct evidence, which is illustrated by
the Eleventh Circuit's approach,192 is that direct evidence can serve to
carry the plaintiff's burden of persuasion on the issue of discriminatory
intent. If the direct evidence is strong enough, a defendant's rebuttal that
consists merely of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason is inade-
quate. 193 The direct evidentiary showing will allow the plaintiff to short-
188. 715 F.2d 1552 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). For an insightful
criticism of the "direct evidence" doctrine promulgated in Bell, see Edwards, Direct Evidence
of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof: An Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1 (1986).
189. Bell, 715 F.2d at 1556. The United States Supreme Court later made this same state-
ment in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act context in Trans World Airlines v. Thur-
ston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff
presents direct evidence of discrimination"). But see infra notes 192, 212-14 and accompany-
ing text.
190. Bell, 715 F.2d at 1557.
191. Id.
192. See also Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, 758 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985) (lower
court's directed verdict for defendant reversed where plaintiff presented direct evidence of dis-
criminatory intent); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (defendant bears
heavier burden when case is proved by direct evidence). This approach has also been adopted
by the Sixth Circuit, in the context of a mixed motive case, Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775
F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985), and has been applied in age discrimination cases in the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Wyo-
ming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985). In Craft, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit refused to consider whether it should adopt the approach because it found that
the district court had not credited any of Craft's proffered "direct" evidence. 766 F.2d at
1211. In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), an age discrimination case,
the Supreme Court seemed to adopt the direct evidence doctrine when it said "the McDonnell
Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Id.
at 121. The "direct evidence" in this case was a policy that forced pilots to retire at age 60. It
has been argued that this "holding" by the Supreme Court, which may be dicta (the burden of
proof issue was not raised by the parties), is questionable due to its reliance on easily distin-
guishable precedents. See Edwards, supra note 188, at 3-4. The age-based retirement policy at
issue in Thurston constituted overt disparate treatment and, consequently, there was no need
to engage in the causation showings required in Craft and Hopkins.
193. Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982).
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circuit the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. In a single motive case,
the plaintiff's burden has been carried if the trier of fact finds from direct
evidence that a discriminatory motive influenced the employment
decision.
Direct evidence can serve a variety of other functions in a disparate
treatment case.194 In the Eleventh Circuit approach described above,
strong direct evidence of a discriminatory statement could serve to cir-
cumvent the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine process and to carry the plain-
tiff's burden of proving that an impermissible factor motivated the
employment decision. In a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine circumstantial
evidence case, direct evidence still may be introduced, not for the pur-
pose of proving the existence of an impermissible factor, but rather for
proving pretext. For example, the plaintiff may offer direct evidence that
the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason was fabricated. 195
In both circumstantial and direct evidence cases, if the defendant is
deemed to have been motivated either by a discriminatory or a nondis-
criminatory reason, the court does not engage in the process of finding a
causal connection between the discriminatory factor and the employment
decision. A finding of causation is inherent in the determination that the
discriminatory reason was the "real" reason for the outcome. In some
cases, however, direct evidence may in fact demonstrate the existence of
both permissible and impermissible factors, thus forcing the courts into a
further process of deciding the degree to which the employment decision
was affected by either of these factors. 196
194. See the discussion of the variety of forms which "direct evidence" can take in a dispa-
rate treatment case in Edwards, supra note 188, at 14-15.
195. See, eg., discussion supra note 182.
196. In Bell, for example, the Eleventh Circuit initially attempted a single motive analysis,
but eventually reached a decision that implicitly recognized the existence of multiple motives.
In a footnote, the court observed that "it is unclear whether this case presents a 'mixed motive'
situation." Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1558 n.9 (1983). The plaintiff
presented direct evidence of a discriminatory statement made in the context of the employment
decision. The supervisor responsible for promotions had said that if he promoted a woman to
the washroom, "every woman in the plant would want to go into the washroom." Id. at 1553.
The defendant countered with evidence that the plaintiff was originally given the job in ques-
tion, but that certain additional responsibilities required by the job could not be performed by
a woman. The defendant also offered evidence that the male who had eventually gotten the job
had superior qualifications for the position. The court rejected the relevancy of the latter
evidence, framing the question on remand as whether the defendant had imposed the addi-
tional responsibilities on the plaintiff because of her gender. Id. at 1552. The court attempted
to narrow the question to either/or status: either the decision was motivated by a discrimina-
tory reason (artificially imposed responsibilities) or a nondiscriminatory reason (legitimate ad-
ditional responsibilities). Although the court found the direct evidence of the discriminatory
remark to be "highly probative evidence of illegal discrimination," it did not end its analysis
after crediting that evidence. It stated that the direct evidence carried the plaintiff's burden of
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(2) Mixed Motive Analysis and Causation
Single motive analysis is based on the assumption that one reason
(either discriminatory or not) motivated the employment decision at is-
sue. Mixed motive analysis in Title VII cases developed with the realiza-
tion that an either-or approach to employment decisions does not reflect
realistically the variety of factors at play in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. 197 As one commentator has noted, this type of analysis "reflects the
contrast between the discrete nature of the regulatory prohibition
proving discrimination. But the court extended the liability determination to give the defend-
ant a chance to rebut the plaintiff's case. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the defendant could
only rebut the plaintiff's showing by proving that the same employment decision would have
been reached absent plaintiff's gender. Id. at 1558 n.13 (citing Mt. Healthy School Dist. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). The court found it "particularly appropriate" that the defendant
should bear the burden of persuasion as to the determinative nature of the nondiscriminatory
reason: the defendant "clearly has greater access to proof of these facts than does [the plain-
tiff]." Id. In this case, the court recognized the possible existence of two or more factors
influencing the employment decision. The burden placed on the defendant was not that of
negating the discriminatory factor (that is, of negating that which was proved by the direct
evidence), but rather of proving that another, nondiscriminatory factor was determinative.
Mt. Healthy was not an employment discrimination case brought under Title VII. In that
case, a school teacher, who had engaged in a variety of questionable activities (arguing with
school officials, making obscene gestures to students) was fired after he released the school's
teacher dress code to a radio station. The Court noted that the burden fell first on the plaintiff
to prove that this constitutionally protected conduct had been a "substantial factor" in the
decision. Once the teacher carried this burden, however, the burden of proof shifted to the
school board to show that the same decision would have been reached absent the constitution-
ally protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. In Mt. Healthy, the court provided the
defendant the opportunity to prove that the teacher would have been fired even if he had not
engaged in the constitutionally protected activity. The lower court, upon finding that one of
the several reasons for firing the plaintiff was impermissible, ordered reinstatement and
backpay without giving the defendant a chance to respond. Id. at 284.
197. The degree of overlap between the single motive and mixed motive methods of analy-
sis was made clear by the variety of approaches taken by the parties and the amici curiae who
filed briefs in the Hopkins case. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the case as a
mixed motives case. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 470. Price Waterhouse argued that the mixed mo-
tive analysis was inappropriate because there was no showing that the stereotyped remarks had
a causal link with the promotion decision. Therefore, they argued, the case should have been
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine paradigm. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 58,
at 42-49. An amicus curiae brief filed in support of Price Waterhouse by the'Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council ("EEAC") used the single motive, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analy-
sis without ever directly characterizing the case as a "single motive" case. Brief of the Equal
Employment Advisory Council in Support of the Petitioner at 13-16, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct 1775, (1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter EEAC Brief]. In its amicus curiae
brief filed in support of Hopkins, the AFL-CIO referred to the case as a "relatively straightfor-
ward mixed motive case." Brief of AFL-CIO, as Amicus Curiae at 1. The United States, as
amicus curiae, argued that the same analysis should apply, regardless of whether the case was
deemed a "single motive" or a "mixed motive" case. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 16, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter
U.S. Brief]. The brief filed by civil rights and women's rights groups argued that neither single
motive nor mixed motive analysis was appropriate but rather the analysis used in "sex-plus"
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[against discrimination] and the richness of human interactions..'..
[P]eople's motives are complex and multi-faceted. It can rarely be said
that any single stimulus is totally responsible for a particular act; many
factors normally contribute."1 98
Thus, a more extensive type of analysis is appropriate when several
factors have contributed to a particular employment decision. Assuming
the plaintiff can show that at least one of these factors was discrimina-
tory, the issue then is one of connection and causation-in what respect
and to what degree is the discriminatory factor correlated with the unfa-
vorable outcome? The first question to be resolved is whether the dis-
crimination in the particular workplace was connected directly to the
employment decision or merely consisted of discriminatory attitudes "in
the air" at the time the decision was made. If a direct connection is
present, the second question is the degree to which the discriminatory
factor affected the decision-that is, whether it was "a" factor in the
decision, a "motivating" factor, or a "substantial" factor. Finally, once
it is shown that a discriminatory factor contributed directly and in the
appropriate degree to the decision's outcome, a court must then deter-
mine whether the decision would have been the same absent the discrimi-
natory factor. In conjunction with this determination, a court must
decide which party should bear the burden of proving the various facets
of causation. A court also must ascertain whether the issues of violation
and remedy can be separated at any point or whether there is no viola-
tion of Title VII unless there is sufficient causation shown to result in an
order for the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of the plaintiff.
cases in which a facially neutral employment requirement is applied disproportionately to one
gender. NOW Brief, supra note 108, at 34-36.
198. Stonefield, supra note 167, at 113. Another perspective on the evolution of mixed
motive analysis is that courts were forced to develop a new form of analysis in reaction to the
increased sophistication of employers in hiding discriminatory motives. At the time Title VII
was passed, a job advertisement which noted that "women need not apply" was not uncom-
mon. As the scope of Title VII became more apparent, however, employers that really wanted
to discriminate were forced into more subtle forms of discrimination-e.g., unnecessary
height/weight requirements. It should be noted, however, that the concept of mixed motives
was discussed in the legislative history surrounding Title VII. An amendment to Title VII was
introduced in the Senate that would have changed the causation language of Section 703(a) to
prohibit employment decisions made "solely because of" sex (race, religion, etc.). 110 CONG.
Rnc. 13837 (1964). Both Houses of Congress rejected the amendment. In discussing this
rejection, Senator Case noted that the proposed language presumed the employment decision
had only one motivation, the discriminatory one. He observed that, "If anyone ever had an
action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know
of." 110 CONG. REc. 13837 (1964).
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a. Initial Showing of a Causal Connection
Before standard of causation issues can be raised in a mixed motives
case, there must be some initial showing that a causal connection existed
between the discriminatory factor and the employment decision at issue.
In Hopkins, Price Waterhouse argued that the stereotyped remarks made
about Hopkins and other female candidates showed no more than dis-
crimination "in the air" and bore no direct connection to the negative
decision on Hopkins' promotion.1 99 The accounting firm attacked Dr.
Fiske's conclusion that the stereotyped remarks actually were related to
the employment decision on four grounds, stating: 1) that the remarks
were made primarily by Hopkins' supporters; 2) that some of the re-
marks pertained to women who had in fact been promoted; 3) that the
persons making the remarks had little or no say in the actual decision;
and 4) that the implications of the remarks were "either utterly benign
or, at worst, ambiguous, requiring a healthy imagination to assign illicit
motivation to them." 2°°
199. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 58, at 42-49.
200. Id. at 48. The issue of causal connection was also the primary concern of the United
States in its amicus curiae brief in Hopkins. The United States' brief stressed that the "because
of" language of Title VII required a causal link between the "expression of stereotypes" and
illegal conduct on the part of the employer. U.S. Brief, supra note 197, at 8-9. The United
States cited the legislative history of Title VII in which Senator Case rejected the concept of
Title VII as a "thought control bill," noting that "[tihere must be a specific external act, more
than a mental act." Id. at 9 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7254 (1964)). The United States urged
that the case be remanded to the district court to establish whether a causal connection existed
between the stereotyped utterances and the negative decision. U.S. Brief, supra note 197, at 7-
8. In Hopkins' brief, the issue of causation was dealt with somewhat superficially. Hopkins
merely referred to the lower court's decision that the stereotyped remarks constituted evidence
of discriminatory motive. Brief for Respondent at 30-31, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.
Ct. 1775 (1989) (No. 87-1167). The amicus curiae brief filed by NOW, however, addressed the
issue more completely, arguing that "[t]he record is replete with evidence of intentional sex
discrimination, both direct and circumstantial." NOW Brief, supra note 108, at 22. Hopkins'
supporters stated that the comments of Price Waterhouse clearly focused on Hopkins' gender
rather than on her abilities and that her perceived deficiencies clearly "lay in her failure to
conform to sex-based stereotypes." Id. at 23. In support of these assertions, NOW cited a
variety of cases in which stereotyped assertions about employees were found to constitute Title
VII violations. Id. at 28-29 (citing Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985); Fields v.
Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d
1163 (9th Cir. 1984); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983); EEOC v.
FLC & Brothers Rebel, 663 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Va. 1987)). Unlike the Hopkins case, how-
ever, in most of these cases there seemed to be little question as to whether a link existed
between the remarks and the employment decision. For example in Thorne, 726 F.2d at 463,
and Fadhl, 741 F.2d at 1165, two women were unsuccessful in their bids for police officer jobs
because they were perceived by their evaluators to be too feminine and too much like a lady.
In FLC & Brothers Rebel, the court found that the articulated reason of firing a female for
using "unladylike language" (in a place where foul language by men was tolerated) itself con-
stituted direct evidence that "ladies are held to a somewhat higher standard than men." 663 F.
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The Supreme Court assigned little weight to these arguments by
Price Waterhouse. In the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan observed
that the causal connection between the remarks and the decision was
obvious. He referred to Dr. Fiske's testimony as "icing on Hopkins'
cake, ' 201 noting that "[i]t takes no special training to discern sex stere-
otyping" in some of the partners' remarks. '202 Brennan pointed out that
the method by which Price Waterhouse chose partners20 3 included a reli-
ance on the comments of all partners, regardless of the stereotyped na-
ture of the comments. He also observed that a "negative comment, even
when made in the context of a generally favorable review, nevertheless
may influence the decisionmaker to think less highly of the candi-
date .... ,,204 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, characterized
the stereotyped remarks as "direct evidence" 20 5 that Price Waterhouse
had allowed an impermissible factor to play a part in its decisionmaking
process. 20 6 Having disposed with this initial inquiry, the Court went on
Supp. at 869. See also Vant Hul v. City of Dell Paris, 428 F. Supp. 828, 831 (1978) (female
manager was replaced because the mayor was convinced that the job "needs a man"). Com-
pare the foregoing with Fields, in which the court found that the "pervasively sexist attitude on
the part of the male members of the sociology department" constituted direct evidence of
discrimination against the female teacher they failed to tenure. 817 F.2d at 935. The Ameri-
can Psychological Association bolstered the showing of a causal link in its amicus curiae brief,
describing the three accepted factors for promoting stereotypes in the workplace (rarity of the
stereotyped individual within the evaluation setting, ambiguity of the criteria used to make the
evaluation, and paucity of information available to evaluators) and stating that Dr. Fiske had
clearly demonstrated the existence of these factors at Price Waterhouse and that the firm had
taken no effective steps to cure this problem. Brief of APA, supra note 58, at 20-25.
201. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1793.
202. Id
203. Id. at 1781. At Price Waterhouse, a senior manager may be considered for partner-
ship when the partners in a local office make a partnership nomination. Other partners are
invited to submit either "long" or "short" form written comments on the candidate. Not
every partner, however, submits. comments on each candidate. After reviewing the comments
and interviewing the partners who submitted them, the Admissions Committee recommends
either "accept", "hold," or "deny" to the Policy Board. The Policy Board then decides
whether to submit the candidate to the entire partnership for a vote, to hold, or to reject. Id.
204. Id. at 1794.
205. Id. at 1803. Justice O'Connor characterized the evidence as follows:.
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the room where the partner-
ship decisions were being made. As the partners filed in to consider her candidacy,
she heard several of them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for part-
nership. As the decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those privy
to the decision-making process that her gender was a major reason for the rejection
of her partnership bid.
Id. at 1802. Justice O'Connor would not, however, have been content merely with Dr. Fiske's
testimony that gender "played a role" in the decision. The Justice noted that gender and race
always "play a role" in employment decisions. Rather, Justice O'Connor would require plain-
tiffs to show that the role played by the impermissible factor was "substantial". Id at 1803.
206. Justice Kennedy, though -agreeing that "[e]vidence of use by decisionmakers of sex
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to the more complex analysis of whether the impermissible stereotyping
was the legal "cause" of the negative employment decision.
b. Standard of Causation Prior to Hopkins
Assuming that a causal link between the stereotyped assertions and
the employment decision has been shown, the next step in a disparate
treatment case of this type is to determine the degree to which the stere-
otyping affected the employment decision. The two intertwined issues
arising here are the weight the stereotyping factor had in the decision and
the allocation of the burden of proving that weight. By far the most
stringent causation standard applied by courts in mixed motive cases
prior to Hopkins was that which forced the plaintiff to carry the burden
of proving "but for" causation. 20 7 Borrowed from tort law,20 8 the "but
for" test comprises a showing that the impermissible factor (e.g., sex ster-
eotyping) was the "determining" factor in the employment decision-
that is, the decision would have been favorable to the employee "but for"
the sex stereotyping. This test also is referred to as the "same decision"
test in that it must be shown that the same decision would have been
made absent the impermissible consideration of the plaintiff's sex, as evi-
denced by the stereotyping. An important difference among courts that
recognize this test is that some courts assign the burden of showing "but
for" causation to the plaintiff rather than to the defendant.20 9
stereotypes is ... quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent," refused to separate
the finding of a causal connection from the determination that the stereotypes were the legal
cause of the negative decision. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In a footnote, he spoke disparag-
ingly of the district court's reliance on the testimony of Dr. Fiske, stating that any "plaintiff
who engages the services of Dr. Fiske should have no trouble showing that sex discrimination
played a part in any decision." Id. at 1813 n.5.
207. See Stonefield, supra note 167, at 113-21; Brodin, supra note 170, at 301-10.
208. See Brodin, supra note 170, at 313-16.
209. Prior to Hopkins, the Supreme Court had said little about the standard of causation
applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment test. Courts in the First, Third, and Seventh
Circuits adopted the stringent causation standard, placing the burden of showing "but for"
causation on the plaintiff. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (age discrimination
case); Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1977). However, in Fields v.
Clark University, 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to
retreat somewhat from its earlier decisions when it determined that, in cases in which direct
evidence of discrimination is present, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the same
employment decision would have been made absent the discriminatory factor. Id. at 937. See
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ.
Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1987); Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228
(7th Cir. 1986); La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th
Cir. 1984) (age discrimination case). These courts drew their authority from both the language
of Title VII and the case law construing that language. They began by pointing out that Title
VII prohibits discrimination "because of" an individual's race, gender, etc. See McQuillen v.
Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d
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Placing the "but for" burden on the plaintiff requires the plaintiff to
prove three things. First, the plaintiff must show the existence of a dis-
criminatory factor in the employment context. Second, the plaintiff must
show that the discriminatory factor directly affected the employment de-
cision; a mere showing of discrimination in the employment unit at large
is not enough.210 Finally, the plaintiff must show that the employment
decision would have been favorable "but for" the employer's impermissi-
ble consideration of her gender.21 1 Theoretically, these showings can be
made with direct evidence, with circumstantial evidence using the Mc-
Donnell Douglas model of proof212 or by a combination of the two.213
The court's assessment of liability depends, finally, upon whether the
1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979) (construing "because of" language of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act). They then cited a footnote from McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976). In that case, in the context of a definition of "pretext," the
United States Supreme Court noted a plaintiff is not required to show that the impermissible
factor was the sole cause of the unfavorable employment decision; rather, "no more is required
to be shown than that [the impermissible factor] was a 'but for' cause." Idi Courts coupled
this quote with the Burdine statement that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all
times with the plaintiff and concluded that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving "but for"
causation. In a footnote in Hopkins, Justice Brennan explained that McDonald was distin-
guishable from the case at bar because it was a "pretext" case and thus did not involve mixed
motives. He also stated that the footnote in McDonald "does not suggest that the plaintiff
must show but-for cause; it indicates only that if she does so, she prevails." Hopkins, 109 S.
Ct. at 1785 n.6.
The circuits that adopted this standard of "but for" causation usually did so in the con-
text of a McDonnell Douglas analysis. See Wheeler v. Snyder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1233
n.4 (7th Cir. 1986), in which the court noted that the "but for" test is "embodied in the third
step of the McDonnell Douglas test." See also Fields v. Clark University, discussed supra note
198, in which the First Circuit shifted the burden of proving the "but for" cause to the defend-
ant if there was direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence of discrimination. In Lewis v.
University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit noted that a causation
analysis is relevant at the "pretext" stage of a McDonnell Douglas case. Id at 915. The Lewis
cour t did not characterize the case as a "mixed motives" case. A comment the court made in a
footnote, however, seemed to imply that the "but for" analysis, while appropriate in a mixed
motive case, may serve to narrow the mixed motives down to a single motive. The court noted
that "[t]here may be several determinative factors which lead to any given 'decision, all of
which can be 'but for' causes of the challenged action. The ultimate 'but for' test, however,
subsumes within its determination all such factors." Id. at 917 n.8.
210. Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
211. Congress rejected a proposed amendment to Title VII that would have established a
"sole factor" test. 110 CONG. REc. 13837-38 (1964). See discussion supra note 198. The
dissenting judge in Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 922 (3d Cir. 1984) (Ad-
ams, J., dissenting), argued that placing the "but for" burden on the plaintiff amounted to little
more than a "sole basis" test.
212. Cases such as Lewis, 725 F.2d at 915 and Snyder, 794 F.2d at 1233 n.4, indicate that
the "but for" test is in fact incorporated into the third step of the McDonnell Douglas model.
213. LaMontaguev. American Convenience Products, 750 F.2d- 1405 (7th Cir. 1984)
(court applied "but for" standard to plaintiff's attempts to prove age discrimination using both
direct evidence and .the McDonnell Douglas model).
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plaintiff has proved that the same employment decision would have been
made absent consideration of the impermissible factor.
Prior to Hopkins, several other circuit courts took the position that
the plaintiff's burden in a mixed motive case was not to show "but for"
causation, but rather to show that the impermissible factor was a "signifi-
cant" 214 or at least a "discernible"21 5 factor in the employment decision.
This burden obviously includes the burden of proving an initial causal
connection between the decision and discriminatory animus present in
the workplace. It does not force the plaintiff, however, to show that the
impermissible factor was the determining factor in the decision.
Some courts that adopted this approach pointed out that it was a
particularly appropriate approach for mixed motive cases. They agreed
with the notion that a "but for" finding is inherent in the McDonnell
Douglas analysis if the pretext eliminates all possible nondiscriminatory
reasons underlying the employment decision. They noted, however, that,
in a mixed motive case, "a finding of pretext does not necessarily trans-
late into Title VII liability. '21 6 Rather, direct or circumstantial evidence
may serve merely to show that there was a discriminatory factor at work
in the employment decision. 217
Most courts that required the plaintiff to demonstrate an impermis-
sible factor played a role in the employment decision still used the "but
for" causation test. The difference, however, was that once the plaintiff
demonstrated a discriminatory factor, these courts shifted the burden to
the defendant to show that the same employment decision would have
been made absent consideration of the impermissible factor.2' 8
214. See Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984)
(age discrimination case); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir.
1980).
215. See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985).
216. Haskins v. United States Dept. of Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1198 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987).
See also Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc. 775 F.2d 703, 709 n.8 (6th Cir. 1985) (McDonell-Doug-
las test is designed to ascertain true reason for discharge).
217. See Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 1983);
Spanier v. Morrison's Management Serv., 822 F.2d 975, 979-80 (11th Cir. 1987); Blalock v.
Metal Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 711 (6th Cir. 1985). But see Smith v. State, 749 F.2d 683,
687 (11th Cir. 1985) (indicating that this type of analysis was available only if the plaintiff had
proved discrimination by direct evidence).
218. This approach is similar to and in some senses indistinguishable from the direct evi-
dence approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit, discussed supra text accompanying notes 188-
95. The courts base their approach on three United States Supreme Court cases that were not
decided in the context of Title VII. See Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977) (first amendment case discussed supra note 196); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (fourteenth amendment); NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (unfair labor practices case discussed
infra at note 220). See Brodin, supra note 170, at 304-08, for a discussion of Mt. Healthy and
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Some courts considered this causation showing at the liability phase
of the trial.219 In these cases, a "same decision" showing by the defend-
ant was similar to an affirmative defense. The plaintiff demonstrated that
the defendant had discriminatory intent that affected the employment
decision at least in part.220 The defendant then was required to show
that, though it may have considered impermissible factors, the decision
would have been the same absent those factors. If the defendant makes
this showing, there is no Title VII liability.2 21
Other courts allowed the defendant to make a "same decision"
showing only at the remedy phase of the trial.222 These courts borrowed
Village of-Arlington Height See also discussion of evolution of burden of proof theories from
labor law cases in Edwards, supra note 188, at 4-8.
219. See, e.g., Spanier v. Morrison's Management Service, 822 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1987)
(cafeteria manager); Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc. 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985) (salesman for
self-described "Christian company"); Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138 (1 1th
Cir. 1983) (cosmetics sales representative).
220. Blalock 775 F.2d at 711. This approach is borrowed from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). In this unfair labor
practice case, the Court accepted the NLRB's position that once certain union-related conduct
has been shown to have been a "motivating" factor in the discharge of an employee, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to prove that the same decision would have been made absent this
union activity. The Court justified this burden-shifting as follows:
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegiti-
mate by statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal
motives cannot be separated because he knowingly created the risk and because the
risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.
Id. at 403. In affirming the approach taken by the NLRB, the Supreme Court also affirmed the
NLRB's reasoning in an earlier case, NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The labor cases are closely analogous to Title VII cases in that
the law in question, § 158(a) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982),
makes it an "unfair labor practice for an employer... (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of [the employee's right to engage in union activity] ...(3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." In Wright Line, the
First Circuit refused to permit the NLRB to place the burden on the employer to prove that
the same decision would have been made absent the improper consideration of an employee's
union activity. The court distinguished Mt Healthy, discussed supra note 196, from "most
labor cases" in that the employer in Mt Healthy admitted that the teacher had been fired due,
at least partially, to his speech activity, while the employer in most labor cases "vigorously
disputes the determining reason for the discharge." Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906. The First
Circuit stated that the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting applied only to the issue of remedy, after a
violation of the Constitution had been proved. Id. In Transportation Management, the
Supreme Court did not address the inaccuracy of this distinction, stating only that the "anal-
ogy to Mt. Healthy drawn by the [NLRB] was a fair one." 462 U.S. at 403.
221. Blalock 775 F.2d at 712.
222. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (print shop supervisor);
Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1980) (reverse discrimination, Dept. of Labor);
Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (hospital employee). See also Smallwood v.
United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984) (age discrimination case). For a discussion
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this approach from Title VII class action cases, in which the plaintiff
initially makes a showing of a pattern of discriminatory activity by the
employer.223 Once liability is established, the employer has the opportu-
nity to show for each individual plaintiff that the same employment deci-
sion would have been made for that plaintiff absent the discriminatory
motive.224 The employer's liability is established once the discrimination
showing is made. Thus, the plaintiff may be entitled to some combina-
tion of an injunction, a declaratory judgment, and attorneys' fees. 225
This finding of liability is deemed appropriate to the Title VII purpose of
"the rooting out and deterrence of job discrimination. ' 226 Before reme-
dies such as backpay, promotion, or reinstatement are awarded, however,
the defendant is allowed to prove that the plaintiff would not have had a
favorable decision absent the consideration of the impermissible factor.
This causation finding prevents the plaintiff from being awarded a wind-
fall to which she otherwise would not have been entitled.227
Of those courts that placed the "same decision" burden on the de-
fendant, at least two circuits decided that the defendant should carry this
burden by clear and convincing evidence rather than merely by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 228 One judge on the D.C. Circuit noted that this
of Bibbs and other cases which have separated the liability and remedy findings, see Title VII
Mixed-Motive Cases: The Eighth Circuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and Remedy, 36
DRAKE L. REV. 155 (1987); Comment, Bibbs v. Block.- Standard of Causation and Burden of
Proof in an Individual Disparate Treatment Action under Title VI, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1439 (1985) (authored by Robert W. Humphries).
223. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977). See
also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976) (racially discriminatory hiring
and discharge policies for over-the-road truck drivers). Justice O'Connor discussed these cases
in her concurring opinion in Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1799.
224. See, e.g., East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (dis-
criminatory no-transfer rule and seniority system); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S.,
431 U.S. 324 (1977) (discrimination in hiring line drivers); Franks v. Bowman Transp Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976) (discrimination in hiring truck drivers); Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083
(D.C. Cir. 1976), was in fact a class action case. It has been argued, although unsuccessfully,
that the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983), was
designed to limit this bifurcated approach to class actions. See Haskins v. United States Dept.
of Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1198 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1987).
225. Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322-24. The major criticism of the Bibbs approach has come
from a court which objected to the fact that the Bibbs court only required the plaintiff to prove
that discrimination played "some part" (rather than a substantial part) in the employment
decision. See Blalock, 775 F.2d at 712.
226. Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324.
227. See Brodin, supra note 170, at 323-26. This solution to the causation problems in
mixed motive cases was originally proposed by Brodin.
228. See, e.g., Muntin v. California Parks and Recreation Dept., 738 F.2d 1054, 1055
(1984) (deckhand applying for job with historic ships exhibit); Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364,
1368 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture employee). The "clear and convincing"
standard has been expressly rejected in Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 (1Ith Cir. 1984).
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more stringent standard "may well discourage unlawful conduct by em-
ployers. ' 229 Until the D.C. Circuit decision in Hopkins, this clear and
convincing standard was applied only when the defendant was using the
"same decision" test to defeat retroactive relief rather than to rebut the
showing of liability.
c. Standard of Causation after Hopkins
In his discussion of the standard of causation in Hopkins, Justice
Brennan accurately characterized the current state of the law on this is-
sue as one of "disarray. ' 230 As discussed above, courts had created stan-
dards of causation ranging from the impermissible factor playing "any"
part in an employment decision, to the factor playing a "discernible" or
"motivating" part, to the factor playing a "substantial" part, and finally
to requiring the factor to play the determinative part in the decision.
Additionally, courts had intertwined inextricably the standard of causa-
tion with the allocation of burdens of proof, and had vacillated between
the causation standard as a necessary component in the liability determi-
nation, or only in arriving at a remedy. The Supreme Court's decision
purported to settle all three of these problems. In reality, after sifting
through the semantics of the plurality opinion, the two concurrences,
and the dissent, it remains unclear exactly what has been accomplished
by Hopkins.
Justice Brennan began the plurality opinion by disclaiming the "but-
for" standard of causation. 231 He pointed out that the prohibition in Ti-
tle VII against actions taken "because of" an individual's gender "meant
to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate considerations. ' 232 He concluded that any employer who
took gender into account, who made gender a relevant factor in the deci-
sionmaking process, had violated Title VII.233 He did not end the liabil-
ity inquiry at this point, as might have seemed logical in the construct he
had created. Rather, he went on to state that an employer who was
shown to have allowed gender to play a "motivating part" in an employ-
ment decision still would have the opportunity to avoid liability by prov-
ing that the same decision would have been made absent the
229. Toney, 705 F.2d at 1373 (Tamm, J., concurring).
230. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2.
231. He explained that the footnote in McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., discussed supra
note 209, did not require a showing of but for causation, but rather indicated that a plaintiff
who did make such a showing would win. He also noted that McDonald was a pretext case
which he distinguished from the "mixed motives" case at bar. 109 S. Ct. at 1785 n.6.
232. Id. at 1785.
233. Id.
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impermissible factor.234 Justice Brennan likened this showing on the
part of the employer to an "affirmative defense, '2 35 explaining that it
mirrored the balance in Title VII between employee rights and employer
prerogatives. 236
Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality's inconsistency, pointing out
that Justice Brennan had denounced the "but for" standard of causation
and yet re-incorporated it into the liability showing by allowing the em-
ployer to prove that the "same decision" would have been made. 237 In
essence, Justice Brennan had not changed the standard of causation; he
had merely shifted the burden of meeting that standard to the employer.
Justice Kennedy criticized this burden-shifting, finding that it gutted the
long-accepted McDonnell Douglas-Burdine order of proof.2 3 8 He stated
that paradigm was adequate for mixed motive cases as well as pretext
cases and that the difficulties in enforcing this new "dual burden-shifting
mechanism" would outweigh greatly any of its benefits. 239
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor sought to find a middle
ground between the plurality and the dissent. She advocated the burden-
shifting mechanism but limited the shifting to those cases in which the
plaintiff has shown by direct evidence that the employer placed "substan-
tial" reliance on impermissible factors in making the employment deci-
sion.240 She agreed with Justice Kennedy that the "but for" standard
remained the appropriate standard of causation. She also pointed out,
234. Id. at 1787-88.
235. Id. at 1788.
236. Id. at 1784-85. Justice Brennan cited Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management,
the same cases used by the Eleventh Circuit in Bell, discussed supra text accompanying notes
189-95, when it originally departed from the McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine paradigm in direct
evidence cases.
237. Id. at 1808-09 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1810-11. Justice Kennedy also criticized the plurality's reliance on Mt. Healthy
and Transportation Management, finding them irrelevant to the Title VII discussion. Id. at
1811.
239. Id. at 1812. Justice Kennedy noted that courts would have difficulty deciding when
to apply the Hopkins mechanism because they first would have to determine whether a factor
had played a "substantial" role and whether evidence was "direct," "indirect" or "circumstan-
tial." Id. In fact, none of these terms were used by Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion.
Rather, it was Justice O'Connor who had insisted that the impermissible factor play a "sub-
stantial" role and that the evidence be direct. Justice Kennedy also stated that "almost every
plaintiff is certain to ask for a Price Waterhouse instruction." Id. This statement is somewhat
puzzling because Title VII plaintiffs are not entitled to jury trials. Finally, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that in age discrimination cases (in which jury trials are allowed), it might become
standard practice to bifurcate the trial, requiring the jury first to make a finding of whether the
impermissible consideration played a substantial role in the decision and then as to whether
the employer had adequately made a "same decision" showing. Id.
240. Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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however, that both evidentiary probabilities and the Title VII purpose of
deterring discrimination in any form justified a departure from the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine paradigm in certain cases.2 41 Justice O'Connor
argued that Hopkins had "taken her proof as far as it could go."'2 42 Hop-
kins had proved not only that Price Waterhouse had allowed stereotyped
attitudes to play a part in her promotion decision but also that the part
these attitudes had played had been a significant one. To require the
employer at this point to bear the risk of nonpersuasion, she reasoned, is
consistent with Title VII's purpose of deterring discriminatory
conduct.243
It is difficult to articulate the effect of the Hopkins opinions.
Clearly, the burden of proving "but for" causation no longer is on the
plaintiff in all Title VII cases. Also, the showing by the employer that
the same decision would have been made absent the impermissible con-
sideration remains a part of the liability finding and does not constitute a
separate showing designed to limit relief. Finally, the employer need
only carry this burden by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than
by clear and convincing evidence. 244 The important issue of the weight
that an impermissible factor must have carried in an employment deci-
sion in order to shift the burden to the employer, however, remains in a
limbo between the "motivating factor" standard of the plurality and the
"substantial factor" standard of Justice O'Connor.
Perhaps what the Hopkins case failed to accomplish is more relevant
to the status of professional women. The Court chose to treat the case as
a typical mixed motives case.245 In such a case, a negative employment
241. Id. Justice O'Connor distinguished the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine paradigm as one
that applied primarily in cases in which there was only circumstantial evidence of discrimina-
tory intent. She noted that an employer is not "entitled to the same presumption of good faith
where there is direct evidence that it has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consider-
ation is forbidden by Title VII." Id.
242. Id. at 1802.
243. Id. at 1804. Justice O'Connor looked to the decisions in Title VII class action cases
as precedent for her approach. Ia at 1799. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
244. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals because that court had
required Price Waterhouse to prove the same decision would have been made by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. 1792.
245. Justice Kennedy, however, disagreed that a model of proof different from the McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine paradigm was necessary for mixed motives cases. He insisted that para-
digm could be applied either in cases where the plaintiff sought to show pretext or in cases
where the plaintiff sought to show directly that discrimination motivated the employer's ac-
tions. Id. at 4485 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Two decisions handed down since Hopkins indi-
cate that the circuit courts are readily distinguishing "pretext" cases from "mixed motives"
cases and are relying on Hopkins as the model of proof for the latter. Waltman v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 1989); McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 190
(7th Cir. 1989).
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decision is motivated by a combination of factors, only some of which are
legitimate. If we assume for the sake of simplicity that two reasons, a
discriminatory reason and a nondiscriminatory reason, are shown to
have motivated the decision, the question in a mixed motives case is
whether the same decision would have been made absent the discrimina-
tory reason. Justice Brennan would have the defendant bear the burden
of proof in this case, while Justice Kennedy would have the plaintiff
prove that the discriminatory reason "tipped the scales" against the
plaintiff. In either case, in order for the plaintiff to prevail, a court must
conclude that the discriminatory reason carried at least fifty-one percent
of the weight in the decision. 246
The application of this reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, as
Justice Kennedy pointed out, if both reasons contributed equally to the
decision (that is, if either the discriminatory or the legitimate reason,
standing alone, would have produced the result), the plaintiff will lose
because it could be shown that the same decision would have resulted
absent the discriminatory reason. 247 In other words, if an employer en-
gages in the type of sex stereotyping that alone would have produced a
negative employment decision, but the employer is able to prove another,
legitimate, equally powerful reason for the employment decision, the em-
ployer will not be found to have violated Title VII.248 The alternative
approach outlined in Part IV below is designed to hold an employer lia-
ble in such cases. This approach would not, however, require promotion
of an employee the employer would not have promoted even if it had not
engaged in sex stereotyping.
The second flaw in the Hopkins approach relates to the nature of the
so-called "legitimate" reason articulated by Price Waterhouse for deny-
ing Hopkins' promotion. In a typical mixed motives case, an employer
246. A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose an employer makes two statements:
"we do not think women can do this job" and "we do not hire people from New York." The
first consideration is obviously the type which Title VII addresses while the second considera-
tion clearly is not, assuming that it is done for legitimate business purposes. A woman from
New York applies for a job and is turned down. In her suit, she successfully proves that her
gender played an important part in the employer's refusal to hire her. Under both Brennan's
and Kennedy's construct, however, the employer will prevail because it can be easily proved
that the same decision would have been made even if she had been a male from New York.
Therefore, under the approach approved in Hopkins, an employer may refuse to hire all wo-
men provided he also considers another factor that conceivably could exclude some men. Such
actions by the employer would not be considered a "violation" of Title VII.
247. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1808 n.2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was re-
sponding to Justice Brennan's argument that, under the same circumstances, neither reason
could meet the "but for" cause definition required by Justice Kennedy-that is, neither reason
could be found to be the "determining" cause of the action. Id. at 1786.
248. See example described supra note 246.
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offers a legitimate, objective reason for the negative decision. 249 For ex-
ample, objective reasons for not promoting Hopkins might have included
low billable hours, low billings, inability to bring in new business, or even
lack of favorable relationships with the firm's clients. The record showed
that Hopkins not only exhibited none of these defects, but actually ex-
celled in each of these areas.250 Price Waterhouse articulated its legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Hopkins as her
deficiencies in "interpersonal skills," particularly in her relations with
staff members. The Supreme Court seemed to accept this articulated rea-
son as a separate and discrete reason for not promoting an individual.251
The Court devoted little discussion, however, to the fact that a judgment
so subjective as that of an individual's "interpersonal skills" is exactly the
type of judgment prone to stereotyped conclusions, particularly when
made by a group of men, some of whom had barely met the applicant.252
In other words, rather than treating the case as one that combined illegit-
imate motives (Hopkins' gender, as evidenced by the stereotyped re-
marks) and legitimate motives (her purported lack of interpersonal
skills), the analysis in this case should have focused on the inextricability
249. In Hopkins, Justice Brennan noted that the employer should be able to offer "some
objective evidence as to its probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive." Id. at
1791. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice White stated that there is "no special re-
quirement that the employer carry its burden by objective evidence." He would accept an
employer's "credible" testimony that the same decision would have been made absent consid-
eration of Hopkins' gender. Id. at 1796.
250. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
251. For example, Justice Brennan, in his recitation of the background of the case, stated
that, "On too many occasions, however, Hopkins' aggressiveness apparently spilled over into
abrasiveness." Id at 1782. Later in the opinion, however, Justice Brennan did point out that
it takes no "expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed 'interpersonal skills'
can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex
and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism." Id. at 1793.
252. The subjective nature of an evaluation of interpersonal skills has been recognized by a
number of courts. These courts have recognized the potential for such evaluations to result in
conscious or unconscious discrimination, but have generally accepted them as releyant to pro-
motion decisions that involve supervisory positions. See, eg., McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding
County Bd. of Educ., 791 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1986) (white female not promoted because she
was perceived to be inflexible, abrasive, and overly aggressive); Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 760 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1985) (male Sri Lankan not promoted because perceived to be
secretive, asocial, and quarrelsome); Patterson v. Masem, 774 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985) (black
female not promoted because she was found to be abrasive and lacking in interpersonal skills);
Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976) (nine blacks sued company
that used subjective hiring and promotion practices emphasizing demeanor and adaptability);
Mira v. Monroe County School Bd., 687 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (white female not
promoted after complaints of her abrasiveness). See generally Rogers v. International Paper
Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (8th Cir. 1975). In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.
Ct. 2777 (1988), the Supreme Court held that disparate impact analysis is applicable in cases
that involve subjective, discretionary promotion decisions.
of the stereotyped attitudes and the subjective evaluations. 253 This is ex-
actly the type of analysis that Dr. Fiske's testimony undertook. Even
Justice Brennan seemed to diminish the effect of Dr. Fiske's testimony,
however, referring to it only as "icing on Hopkins' cake."' 254 Addition-
ally, this type of analysis would bear some resemblance to the pretext
analysis discounted by the plurality in that the articulation of "interper-
sonal skills" as a separate, legitimate motive may well have been a euphe-
mism for the partners' and staff's inability to respond positively to an
aggressive woman manager. In short, the real focus of the Hopkins deci-
sion should have been not whether the stereotyped attitudes outweighed
Hopkins' lack of interpersonal skills, but rather whether the stereotyped
comments were merely a sexist articulation of an objective, nongender-
oriented problem or a clear indication that any aggressive woman who
applied for partnership at Price Waterhouse would be rejected. 255 In any
event, as will be discussed further in Part IV below, the unrestricted flow
of stereotyped comments at Price Waterhouse was itself a clear sign of
the type of discrimination Title VII was designed to prevent. The ap-
proach taken by the Court, of coupling the liability finding with the
"same decision" affirmative defense, is inadequate to address the preva-
lence of this type of discrimination in the workplace.
IV. A Suggested Alternative Approach to
Sex Stereotyping Cases
Despite Justice Brennan's assertions to the contrary, 25 6 the Hopkins
Court adopted the concept of "but for" causation as a prerequisite for
holding an employer liable under Title VII. The Court did shift the bur-
den of showing such causation to the employer once a showing has been
made that the employer allowed an impermissible factor to play a moti-
vating role in the employment decision at issue. Nevertheless, reliance
253. At the end of the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan did discuss the District Judge's
finding that the complaints about Hopkins' personality may have been legitimate, although to
some degree they may have been reactions to her gender. Justice Brennan noted that the job of
the Supreme Court was not to determine whether Hopkins was "nice," but "to decide whether
the partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is a woman." Hopkins, 109 S.
Ct. at 1795.
254. Id. at 1793.
255. See generally Morris, Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformation Stereotypes and Antidis-
crimination Law, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 251, 258-73 (1989), in which the author proposes
an analysis for cases such as Hopkins that recognizes that a "suspect characteristic" (gender)
may be combined by evaluators with a "non-suspect characteristic" (personality trait, such as
aggressiveness) in such a manner that the non-suspect characteristic itself becomes a discrimi-
nating criterion for evaluators.
256. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1786.
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on this causation standard will allow many employers who make gender
relevant in their decisionmaking processes to escape liability completely
if they can prove that the same decision would have been made even if
gender had not been considered. If one accepts the assumption that a
major purpose of Title VII is to deter employers from considering imper-
missible factors2 57 in decisionmaking, then the insistence on but-for cau-
sation as a prerequisite to liability is inadequate to deal with all but the
most blatant forms of employment discrimination.
The approach outlined in this Part is based on a separation of the
issues of liability and remedy, based on the theory that an employer who
allows sex stereotyping to influence the decisionmaking process has al-
ready violated the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination, even
if the plaintiff might not otherwise have received a favorable employment
decision. From a broader perspective, this approach combines both the
"power" theory of sex discrimination (by imposing a cost on employers
who attempt to perpetuate the white male domination of the workplace)
and the "equality" theory (by allowing only make-whole remedies for
plaintiffs whose individual negative employment decisions would have
been different if gender were not a consideration). This approach is both
an evolution from and a combination of two important theories already
set forth by Professors Mark Brodin258 and Sam Stonefield,259 and by
Professor Nadine Taub.260 The approach presented here adopts Brodin's
and Stonefield's method of separating liability and remedy findings in
Title VII "mixed motive" cases261 and Taub's concept that characteriz-
ing sex stereotyping as discrimination per se is completely consistent with
the goals of Title VII and other fair employment legislation.262 The ap-
proach (although potentially unpopular with both plaintiffs and defend-
ants) attempts to offer an alternative to cases such as Craft and Hopkins
by imposing a legal cost on employers who engage in persistent stere-
otyping without forcing those employers to retain or promote persons
who would not receive these employment opportunities regardless of gen-
der considerations. To the extent that the approach does favor plaintiffs
257. See infra note 267.
258. See discussion of Professor Brodin's theory, supra note 170.
259. See discussion of Professor Stonefield's theory, supra note 167.
260. Taub, supra note 77, at 390-417.
261. See discussion of Professor Brodin's theory supra note 170. The approach articu-
lated, however, is not dependent upon a "pretext"-"mixed motive" dichotomy. See discussion
of Professor Stonefield's approach, supra note 167.
262. See Taub, supra note 77, at 397-409. In his dissent in Hopkins, Justice Kennedy said,
"I think it is important to stress that Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex
stereotyping." 109 S. Ct. at 1813 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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over defendants (in that an employer is found to have violated Title VII
though the employer's discriminatory actions may not have been the de-
termining "cause" of a negative employment decision), the author asserts
only that this approach is framed within the context of the currently
male-dominated workplace, which Catharine MacKinnon has described
as the "affirmative action plan [already] in effect." '263
This approach is based on language of Title VII that makes it an
unlawful employment practice for employers "to discriminate ...be-
cause of such individual's ... sex."' 264 In Hopkins, Justice Brennan
clearly articulated that a decision is made "because of" sex when "an
employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of
making a decision. '265 At this point the employer has violated Title VII
even though it may later be shown that the same decision would have
been made had the employee been male.266 Under the theory developed
in Hopkins, however, an employer may stereotype at will provided it is
able later to show that other legitimate factors were considered as deter-
minative in the employment decision. Under the alternative approach
suggested here, an employer for whom gender is a motivating factor pays
some legal cost for violating Title VII.267 The "same-decision" test is
relevant only on the issue of remedy.
In the first phase of this approach, a finding of liability would be
based on a determination that sex stereotyping played a part in the deci-
sionmaking process. In this regard, the author adopts Justice Brennan's
standard of discriminatory factors playing a "motivating" role in the de-
cision.268 The evidence presented in this phase usually will consist of
263. C. MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 36.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
265. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1785. Several other comments made by Justice Brennan indi-
cate that he favors the theory that an employer violates Title VII when it takes gender into
account in employment decisions. See, e.g., id. ("Congress' intent to forbid employers to take
gender into account in making employment decision appears on the face of the statute."); Id.
at 1786 ("Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block
to employment opportunities."). Justice O'Connor also articulates this theory: "There is no
doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender and race in making employment decision
an evil in itself." Id. at 1798. Yet both of these Justices adhered to the theory that an em-
ployer would not be found to have violated Title VII if it can prove that the same decision
would have been made absent the gender considerations.
266. As noted supra note 246, the Hopkins theory allows an employer to avoid liability
even if the impermissible factor contributed equally in the decision-making process as the legit-
imate factor.
267. This is completely consistent with Title VII's purpose of deterring "conduct which
has been recognized as contrary to public policy and harmful to society as a whole." Id. at
1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
268. The author hesitates to adopt Justice O'Connor's "substantial factor" test in recogni-
tion of the problems articulated by Justice Kennedy in forcing courts to distinguish between
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remarks that either relate personally to the plaintiff and other female em-
ployees, or comments that indicate that the employer consistently relies
on stereotypical attitudes when making decisions about promoting or re-
taining women. In the latter category, comments such as "women are
too emotional for this job" or "a man's objectivity is necessary to our
business" are fairly easy to recognize.269 When the comments are di-
rected towards certain individuals, they may not be as obviously stere-
otypical. For example, comments like "Is she tough enough for this
job?" or "She is too hard-driving to work effectively with the staff," while
not blatantly sex-oriented, still may be strong indications that precon-
ceived notions about women are governing the decisionmaking process.
In this case, expert testimony, such as that of Dr. Fiske in the Hopkins
case, will be appropriate.
Expert testimony also will be appropriate to discern whether the at-
titudes present in the employment situation actually affect the decision-
making process. For example, one or two casual remarks by lower-level
staff members in and of themselves may not constitute appropriate evi-
dence of actionable sex stereotyping. 270 On the other hand, such remarks
may support other evidence illustrating a pervasive company attitude di-
rectly relevant to advancement efforts by female employees. Addition-
ally, stereotyped remarks by supporters of an individual's promotion2 71
may or may not necessarily indicate the plaintiff's employment decision
was negatively affected by sex stereotyping. Such remarks may indicate
that, although this plaintiff may have been lucky enough to escape the
negative effects of the remarks with a particular set of supporters, the
next woman considered may not be so fortunate. It is important to focus
the inquiry at this stage not on whether the stereotyped attitudes may
have been the determining cause of the negative employment decision for
the individual plaintiff, but rather on whether the stereotyping played a
"substantial," as opposed to "discernible" factors. See id. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
It is, however, important to note that the terms "motivating factor" and "substantial factor"
were used interchangeably by the Court in Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 401 (dis-
cussed supra note 220) and Mt Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (discussed supra note 196).
269. Some company policies may also fall into this category, such as the KMBC News
requirement that women anchors portray "professional elegance" as opposed to the male re-
quirement of "professional image." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214.
270. In her concurring opinion in Hopkins, Justice O'Connor pointed out that "stray re-
marks in the workplace," "statements by non-decisionmakers, or statements by deci-
sionmakers unrelated to the decisional process" would not alone suffice to carry the plaintiff's
burden of showing the gender considerations played a substantial role in her negative employ-
ment decision. 109 S. Ct. at 1804.
271. See, for example, remarks made by Hopkins' supporters, supra note 17, and remarks
made by Partner D in the hypothetical situation described supra text accompanying notes 66-
69.
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prevalent role in the decision. 272 If the evidence shows that sex stere-
otyping played such a role, the employer should be found to have vio-
lated Title VII and thus be held responsible for attorneys' fees and court
costs.
Opponents of this approach will argue that, because the finding of
liability at the first phase is not based specifically on a "determining"
causal connection between the plaintiff's negative employment decision
and the defendant's tainted process, such a finding of liability is outside
the scope of Title VII. The approach is not designed, however, to ignore
the need for a causal connection between the employer's impermissible
considerations and the employee's negative employment decision.
Rather, the approach assumes that an employer whose decisionmaking
process is imbued with sex stereotyping is incapable of making an em-
ployment decision about a female employee that is not affected by this
impermissible factor. In other words, the liability phase is designed to
show whether the employer is a "wrongdoer" under Title VII, that the
employer allows gender to play a role in its decisionmaking process. 273
At this phase, the burden of proof is correctly on the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff, however, need only show that sex stereotyping pervaded the process
that resulted in the negative employment decision. This showing in and
of itself will comprise partial causation, and thus, discrimination. At the
second phase, the remedy phase, the employer is given the opportunity to
show that, despite the fact that the employer's attitudes were imbued
with sex stereotyping, the employee simply would not have received a
favorable decision, even if she had been a man. The fact that the em-
ployer is now a "proven wrongdoer" 274 causes the burden of proof to
shift to the employer. Again, this is logical. The employer must now
show that any employee with plaintiff's "problems" would have received
the same treatment. The easiest way for the employer to show this is by
comparing the plaintiff with similarly situated male employees who also
received negative decisions. The employer alone will have access to the
type of evidence necessary to engage in such proof. If the employer can
272. Compare Professor Brodin's theory that the finding at the liability stage is whether a
prohibited criterion was a "motivating factor" in the decision made, Brodin, supra note 170, at
323, with Professor Taub's theory that discrimination per se can be found to exist when it can
be shown that an adverse employment decision was based on a stereotyped role expectation for
members of a certain class. Taub, supra note 77, at 390-91.
273. In this regard, the author adopts Justice Brennan's standard that the "because of"
terminology in Title VII refers to any case in which an impermissible factor, such as gender, is
taken into account in making employment decisions. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1785.
274. Compare this term with the use of the term in the evidence cases described supra note
220.
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make this showing the employer should not be forced to compensate the
plaintiff for damages in the form of back pay, promotion, or
reinstatement. 275
Obviously, in cases such as Hopkins, in which the legitimate reason
articulated by the employer was of such a subjective nature as to'itself
invite stereotyping, the employer bears the additional burden of showing
that the stereotyped attitudes did not so pervade the subjective evaluation
as to destroy the articulated reason's legitimacy. In cases in which such
subjective factors as "interpersonal skills" are offered as the determining
cause for the negative employment decision, Justice Brennan's mandate
in Hopkins that "the employer should be able to present some objective
evidence as to its probable decision in the absence of an impermissible
motive" 276 should be adopted.
This approach is not designed to require courts or parties to decide
whether they are dealing with a pretext case as opposed to a mixed mo-
tives case. The liability finding should fit comfortably within the frame-
work of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine paradigm. The difference,
however, is that courts must be willing to make a finding of discrimina-
tory intent (the liability finding) separate from awarding a remedy.
Courts must be flexible enough to realize that a pretext showing may
either negate completely the employer's articulated reason and thus re-
sult in both liability and "make whole" remedies (as in a "single motive"
case), or may only serve to negate the articulated reasons in part, thus
establishing intent but providing the employer an opportunity to show
that the same decision would have been made absent the discriminatory
factor (as in a "mixed motives" case).
This approach also is not designed to be applied only in so-called
"direct" evidence cases. Rather, the showing of liability may be made
both with direct or circumstantial evidence. In this way it is hoped that
the courts will not have to engage in the time-consuming and often se-
mantic task of distinguishing between the different types of evidence.
The approach outlined in this Part IV is based on three
assumptions:
275. Section 706(g) of Title VII gives the trial court the discretion to enjoin a defendant
from engaging in an unlawful employment practice and to award make-whole remedies, such
as reinstatement, promotion, and back pay. The latter remedies will not be available, however,
if a negative employment decision was made "for any reason other than discrimination on
account of ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
276. 109 S. Ct. at 1791 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion Justice White opined
that "there is no special requirement that the employer carry its burden by objective evidence"
but rather that credible testimony by an employer would suffice. Id. at 1796.
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1) Sex stereotyping, which studies have shown to be deeply embed-
ded in the American workplace, perpetuates the power position of males
by effecting a universal cognitive dissonance between the concepts of "fe-
male" and "feminine" and those of "effective manager" and "able
leaders";
2) The purposes of Title VII include the rooting out of entrenched
discrimination caused by prevalent sex stereotyping, but not the granting
of windfall judgments to plaintiffs who would not have succeeded even if
they had been men;
3) Many women who have neither the evidence nor the means to
pursue litigation will continue to suffer discriminatory treatment unless
employers are encouraged to purge their decisionmaking processes of this
conscious and unconscious stereotyping.
This approach establishes sex stereotyping as discrimination per se.
Employers who engage in such stereotyping will have to pay a legal cost
for failing to root out such attitudes in the upper levels of their manage-
ment structure. The approach has been constructed in the feminist juris-
prudential framework surrounding decisions such as those in Craft and
Hopkins. This is not to say that the framework should be limited only to
the context of the promotion of professional women. The motivation be-
hind the development of this framework, however, has been the realiza-
tion that, at least in this area, Title VII as currently applied has been far
from successful in rooting out the types of subliminal discrimination that
continue to hold women back. Professional women forced to proceed
even along the somewhat broader path outlined in Hopkins will continue
to meet the roadblock of sex stereotyped attitudes. These views are so
deeply entrenched that the judicial system, and certainly the white-male
dominated business community, have not yet appreciated their most in-
sidious forms. Only by holding employers responsible for taking gender
into account, even in ways that are subconscious or apparently benevo-
lent, will Title VII make a substantial contribution to the eradication of
employment discrimination and societal norms that rely primarily, if not
exclusively, on the standards and values of white men.
Conclusion
The discussion above has taken three routes: a survey of the evolu-
tion of feminist jurisprudence, which has accompanied the realization
that "equality" is not possible for women in a world dominated by the
male norm; an examination of numerous psychological and sociological
studies evidencing the concept that, particularly in professional and man-
agerial positions, women face a subliminal "double bind" over which
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they have little or no control; and a review of the judicial attempt to
respond to this built-in "Catch-22" without ignoring the rights of those
who consciously or unconsciously perpetuate the male norm in the work-
place. While respectful of these rights, an alternative judicial approach
would present an approach that opens the door for the success of profes-
sional women in both the short and the long term.
In the short term, the suggested response on a judicial level must
recognize the dominant status of the male norm, the "double bind" in
which professional women find themselves, and the elusive reflection of
this bind in sex stereotyping. Courts must focus on exposing the hinder-
ing effects of that bind and discouraging employers from making employ-
ment decisions that reflect it. In the long range, however, the ultimate
goal is the structuring of a business society in which the "best" of both
genders are free, to contribute and no individuals are favored or dis-
counted solely on the basis of their status as male or female. The sug-
gested approach, while penalizing employers for reliance on the male
norm, does not advocate promoting women solely on the basis of their
gender. Admittedly, this approach is somewhat optimistic in that it as-
sumes a good faith attempt on the part of decisionmakers to separate
neutral criteria from sex-based criteria. Information is a vital aspect of
this separation. As Part II indicates, such information certainly is not
lacking.277 The approach outlined in Part IV is designed to integrate
that information first into judicial decisionmaking and, more impor-
tantly, into workplace decisionmaking. The dismantling of the percep-
tion that women, or people with "female" qualities, cannot be effective
managers and leaders is vital to the effort of building a society in which
there exists a balance between that which is traditionally "male" and that
which is traditionally "female."
277. It is this author's suggestion and hope that the academic and at times arrogant refusal
of different disciplines to engage in interconnected studies in such areas will succumb to the
growing complexity of the problems considered in this Article. Courts and businesses cannot
continue to regard psychological and sociological studies as mere "icing" on a plaintiff's cake.
As noted above, sex stereotyping will not be rooted out of the workplace without the coopera-
tion of experts and influential persons in all disciplines and all occupations. This Article and
the approach herein outlined are offered in the spirit of that cooperation.
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